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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO LEADER VIEWS SENATOR PERCY STATEMENT ON PALESTINIAN STATE

DW091015 Frankfurt Hessischer Rundfunk Network in German 1210 GMT 8 Dec 80

[Excerpts from interview with 'Abdallah al-Ifranji, PLO representative in the Bonn Bureau of the Arab league by reporter Buschlueter--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Did you learn from the papers about Percy's suggestion, or were you informed beforehand about such a move by the senator [U.S. press report on Senator Percy's support for a Palestinian state headed by PLO chief 'Arafat]?

[Answer] I learned about it through the press. But I was not surprised. I was not surprised because the Americans must realize some time that there will be no peace in the Middle East without the Palestinians, the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian state. If Reagan really wants to strengthen or achieve peace in the Middle East, he must embark on the right way, and the right way goes via the PLO.

[Question] Do you have concrete clues indicating that new American President Ronc'd Reagan could get along with state chief 'Arafat, mark my words--state chief?

[Answer] He has to live with that because 'Arafat has been accepted and recognized by most countries as a statesman and not as a terrorist. I believe that 'Arafat is considered by all statesmen of the world not merely as a statesman, but as a respected politician.

[Question] But if the new American president wanted to implement that, he would naturally have to reckon with Israel's resistance. Don't you think that the Israelis would protest vehemently?

[Answer] Naturally, they would protest strongly. But you know, the whole world does not follow the wishes of the Israelis. The world must take into consideration that other factors exist in addition to Israel. Israel must accept that. The times are gone when the Israelis could do as they pleased. We will accept nothing but a Palestinian state on our territory. And we will get that state, whether the Americans like it or not.

CSO: 4403

JORDAN PAPER REPORTS PLO OFFICIAL'S MONTE CARLO INTERVIEW

JN060847 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 6 Dec 80 pp 1, 16

[Text] In its program "What Took Place Tomorrow," Monte Carlo Radio last night hosted Khalid al-Hasan, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Palestine National Council and member of the Fatah Central Committee. AL-RA'Y publishes hereunder what came in this interview exactly as it was broadcast:

Mr Al-Hasan spoke about the consultations which took place in Damascus prior to the Amman summit, about the reasons which drove the resistance movement not to attend this summit and about whether the PLO was pressured not to attend the summit. He said: The truth is that in politics and political relations, there are two kinds of pressure: the first kind of pressure is imposed by the general state of affairs and its political elements that exist when a decision is made. This is justified and legitimate pressure because it is the political decision which takes current circumstances into consideration. In such cases, the choice may be between the lesser of two evils--not that this is what happened regarding the PLO's stand on the summit conference in Amman.

The decision was made by a majority of opinions. It is well-known that there are organizations which adhere to the Syrian position. However, it is also well-known that the situation in Lebanon is volatile or is about to explode. Thus, the interest of the resistance movement lay in not attending, particularly since the other side clearly understood this situation and expressed it in the resolution which was adopted at the summit confirming the PLO's sovereignty as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Jordan's Stand on the PLO

On the Syrian request to Jordan that it reconfirm that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and on why the PLO itself has not requested such a confirmation, Al-Hasan said: We do not demand such a confirmation because in every statement and at every meeting between us and Jordan, the phrase "The PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people" appears in the joint statement issued. This has been the case since the formation of the first committee which drew up the framework for action and cooperation with Jordan after the Baghdad summit. Therefore, we do not need such a confirmation.

The Syrian-Jordanian Crisis

On the PLO's silence over the Syrian-Jordanian crisis, Jordan's constant confirmation of the PLO's role and the accusations leveled by Damascus against Amman which say that Jordan wants to strip the PLO of its role as the Palestinian people's representative, Al-Hasan said: We do not want to pour oil on the fire. The Palestinian issue in the international arena is very earnestly concerned that the Arabs do not differ about it. The unity of the Arab stand gives strength to the Palestinian stand in the international arena. Furthermore, we do not want to interfere in Jordan's or Syria's domestic affairs. Whenever we can, we have constantly tried to extinguish fires in the Arab world because this is in the interest of our cause. This explains our silence. We do not need confirmation or denial because, as I have said, I can say 100 percent clearly that since the Baghdad summit to date, there has been nothing to indicate that there has been a change in the Jordanian stand pertaining to the subject of Palestinian representation.

The Amman Summit

Asked about the PLO's absence from the Amman summit and its attendance of the Tripoli summit, Al-Hasan said: One of the basic principles which enables us to continue in this "mosaic" Arab world--which is stumbling and has become unable to maintain its agreement for a sufficiently long time--behooves us to cling to the accomplishments contained in the Palestinian national charter regarding nonintervention in Arab disputes and the consideration of our cause as being above these disputes.

Our attendance of the steadfastness summit or the Tripoli meetings has absolutely no connection with our absence from the Amman summit since the time, circumstances and the occasion are different. What took place in Tripoli was an urgent call by Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi for internal reasons and other reasons which I need not discuss at this point. It was a heated meeting, and it ended up with a new stand by brother Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi which we in Fatah do not understand. We do not want to open a battle with Libya due to this new stand. Ultimately, Libya is free to take any decision it wants about who to back and who not to back. The important thing, however, is that the occasion, topic and circumstances are different. Thus, there can be no relationship between the two stands. That was one decision and this was another.

I would like to stress that our brothers who attended the summit appreciate our situation, as they have appreciated the situation in Lebanon. They are aware that through our stand, we prevented a lot of harm not only to the PLO and Lebanon, but to several Arab states as well.

Answering a question on his opinion regarding the existence of an intention by those who participated in the Amman summit to impose any form of sanctions against those who boycotted the conference, including the PLO, Khalid al-Hasan said: I cannot answer for the stand of these states regarding the other Arab states. At any rate, Algeria's stand was the result of its earlier declaration of adherence to the PLO's stand and was not against the Amman

summit. I do not want to enter into the subject of what the relations will be between the Arab states which attended and those which did not. However, as far as we are concerned, I do not believe that there is even the mere notion of sanctions because, if this does take place, it will lead to several catastrophes. However, there was censure and there was a wish for the PLO to be present, but there was also appreciation for the PLO's stand.

Al-Hasan said: The United States in particular and Western Europe in general want to see Jordan at the table of negotiations regarding self-rule. However, Jordan strongly rejects this role, particularly since the Arab summit conference in Rabat, which decided that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He added: Jordan has reiterated its rejection of the Camp David accords and the self-rule conspiracy, and it has adhered to this and to the Baghdad summit resolutions. On the basis of this commitment, necessary funds were earmarked for steadfastness, to be dispensed in coordination between Jordan and the PLO. The possibility of cooperation between the two sides began on the groundwork of Jordan's rejection of the Camp David process and the self-rule plot. He added: Attempts continue to be made to drag Jordan into the Camp David accords. However, Jordan rejects this. It is on this basis that we cooperate.

On the differences regarding the dialogue between Jordan and the PLO, Al-Hasan said: The differences regarding the dialogue with Jordan are not in the Fatah movement. The basic difference is with some of our brothers in the other organizations who believe that this dialogue is "useless" while we tell them that in political action, a negative stand is impermissible. He added: I confirm that cooperation with Jordan in the bolstering of steadfastness is proceeding well.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

KLIBI RETURNS TO TUNIS--Damascus, 9 Dec (AFP)--Arab League Secretary-General Chadli Klibi cut short a tour of Arab capitals last night after an apparently fruitless first leg here. Instead of going on to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and South Yemen, Mr Klibi flew straight back to Arab League headquarters in Tunis. There were unconfirmed reports here that Syrian leaders refused for the time being to sign a charter for Arab economic action approved at the recent Arab summit conference, which was boycotted by Syria and other countries of the hardline steadfastness front. Mr Klibi also did not seem to have succeeded in soothing the Syrian-Jordanian dispute. Observers noted that Amman and Damascus continue to exchange accusations. Syria had approved of the economic charter at the foreign ministers' meeting preliminary to the summit. The reported refusal to ratify the charter now might be intended to deny the legitimacy of any measure adopted at the summit, observers here believed. [Text] [NC091410 Paris AFP in English 1351 GMT 9 Dec 80]

CSO: 4820

HABIB CHATTI ON EEC, U.S. ATTITUDE ON PALESTINE

LD080841 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 5 Dec 80 p 1

[Report by Ynis Muhammad Ishaq: "Important Meeting in Paris To Discuss the Fate of Jerusalem; Giscard d'Estaing To Meet With Hassan and Chatti on Monday in the Presence of the Presidents of Bangladesh and Guinea"]

[Excerpt] Paris--Islamic conference secretary general Habib Chatti has greatly welcomed the success of the Saudi mediation to end the Jordanian-Syrian crisis and the Saudi Arabian kingdom's role in the consolidation of Arab and Islamic solidarity. He said he hopes that this Saudi initiative will have positive results in the near future.

Chatti affirmed that on Monday he will meet with French President Giscard d'Estaing in the presence of King Hassan II of Morocco, Bangladesh President Zia Rahman and Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure, to discuss the Palestine issue, the problem of Jerusalem and the action Europe should take in the future.

Chatti pointed out that the Jerusalem committee will carry out extensive contacts by visiting these [European] states and explaining the Islamic states' viewpoint. It will also ask Europe to work for a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem and to contribute to this end by recognizing the Palestinian people's legitimate rights and the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people--improving on the European stand during the Venice and Brussels summits.

He emphasized that Europe's declaration of its intention to continue its efforts for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East is a step that is both constructive and positive.

The Islamic conference secretary general then spoke about the situation in Afghanistan. He said that the [Islamic conference] organization has done everything in its power to hold a dialogue with Moscow but, very regrettably, it could not achieve such a dialogue. The only thing we can do now is to reemphasize our nonrecognition of the present government in Afghanistan and the need for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from its territory and for the Afghan people to be given the opportunity to choose the system of government that suits them.

Chatti pointed out that the Camp David agreement is now completely dead and that the new American administration will inevitably find itself faced with

a problem which needs to be solved. If this administration is to come up with something new, it must be in the form of a new initiative concerning the situation in the Middle East, especially because the situation in this area is liable to explode at any moment.

He expressed his hope that the new American administration will see facts other than the facts that existed during the election period, especially now that the Soviet Union is seeking to expand its influence and despite all Reagan's statements which do not generate optimism. Facts, however, will compel Reagan to amend his stand and to adopt a policy that will take America's real interests into consideration. We are determined to resort to any means to force America to take a clear stand. The Islamic organization will contact the new American administration in order to explain the magnitude of the situation in the Middle East.

CSO: 4802

ISLAM'S ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDERLINED

Kuwait AL-'ARABI in Arabic Nov 80 pp 6-10

[Article by Ahmad Baha' al-Din: "Muslims Are Lagging Behind Islam; Rights of Muslim Man Are Starting Point"]

[Text] Islam is entering its 15th century of the Hegira and the Muslims are lagging behind it by almost 10 centuries.

Backwardness: by what criterion and when did this cycle of backwardness start?

Some may perhaps choose a purely geographic criterion, namely the halt in the geographic growth of the Islamic sphere.

Some may perhaps choose a political date--such as the fall of the Umayyad State, the fall of Andalusia, the invasion of the Arab East by the Tatars and the destruction of Baghdad and then of Damascus or the transfer of the caliphate from the Qurayshis to the Ottomans on the hands of Salim I--as the criterion for the start of the backwardness.

Others may choose as a criterion for the start of the backwardness either the onset of the sectarian split in the Islamic movement, thus returning to the war between 'Ali and Mu'awiyah and the emergence of the split between the Sunna and the Shi'ites or the onset of the intellectual persecution, embodied in the tribulation of Ahmad ibn Hanbal in the days of al-Ma'mun and in forcing scholars and jurists--through imprisonment, torture and execution--to adopt the interpretation of the head of the state on religious, intellectual and philosophical issues.

Actually, I do not want to be arbitrary. Moreover, in interpreting major historical changes, one cannot stop at a single event, regardless of how significant. We consider the significant event a "turning point" which is actually the consequence of long preludes which we perhaps failed to understand before the occurrence of this event.

Consequently, when I say that Islam is entering the 15th century while the Muslims are lagging behind by nearly 10 centuries, I am only trying in fact to take a middle-of-the-road and reasonable position without fanaticism and without underlining a certain event or a certain century in particular.

What I mean--and this is the criterion that I nominate here--by backwardness is not to denote the geographic sense and the area of the state territories, the military sense and the might of the state or the economic sense and the prosperity of the state. What I mean is a general cultural sense that includes all these things and includes fundamentally what is more important, namely: The degree of the proximity or remoteness of the Muslims from the essence of the values and ideals which their religion came to preach, advocate and establish on earth.

Consequently, and this is the second criterion, determining the start of the backwardness entails an endeavor to look for the vast time span in which the phenomena of backwardness--in this comprehensive sense--started to accumulate in succession. Islam was--and this is something on which historians of all races unanimously agree--the fastest religion to proliferate at such a wide scale, even though it was not a religion that spread in vacuum nor in a remote part of the earth. It was a religion that proliferated rapidly, sweeping in its way lofty and strong civilizations and empires.

In less than 1.5 centuries, Islam covered such a vast area of the then known world.

What is more important, this proliferation was not the result of military invasion alone but also the result of the speed with which people of all civilizations and races embraced this new religion which, I have already asserted, is a message and not an empire.

Everything happened rapidly.

Almost everything happened in the first 4 centuries, despite the strong tolerance [in that period].

The important eras came in rapid succession, beginning with the era of al-Rashidun caliphs, then the state of the Umayyads, the state of the Abbasids in Baghdad, the strong states in Andalusia, the Samanid state (in Samarkand), the Ghaznavi state (in Afghanistan), the Hamadani state from Mosul to Aleppo and then the Tulunid and Fatimid state in Egypt.

In those same centuries, we came to know all the prominent and immortal military leaders, beginning with Khalid ibn al-Walid, Tariq ibn Ziyad and ending with Jawhar al-Siqilli [the Sicilian]. Even Saladin came only a little after the 15th century. This, naturally, is not an exact recount but mere examples from widely-spaced places and ages.

In jurisprudence, we knew all the imams and jurists, beginning with Ja'far al-Sadiq and ending with the founders of the four schools: Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi'i, Malik and ibn Hanbal.

In literature, sciences, arts and philosophy, there were al-Jahiz, al-Mutanabbi, al-Kindi, Abu al-'Ala' al-Ma'arri, Ibn al-Haytham, Avicenna, al-Razi, Jabir ibn Hayyan, Ibn Hazm and many others.

The list is enormously long and does not need to be defined.

However, with the sunset of those first centuries, the black thread was beginning to mix with the white thread and darkness was crawling gradually, perhaps with a slowness that was not noticeable to the people of those eras. But when we view the age in its entirety, we can see the darkness clearly.

From Degeneration to Awakening

As usual, the Islamic history knew tyrants at an early stage, beginning with Yasid ibn Mu'awiyah. The good and the bad alternated, rising and falling with the change of states and the transfer of the centers of events. 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Azis reminded people of the justice of al-Rashidun caliphs while striking and destroying the Ka'bah with catapults reminded people of the pre-Islamic era. But the general atmosphere of civilization, both in its rise and its fall, continued to be the main characteristic of those early centuries.

Meanwhile, the elements of degeneration were infiltrating the onrush, or the remnants of the onrush, of the renaissance and were gaining new ground daily. Those elements made gains at times from the inside, with the restriction of the freedom of thought, with the end of the era of the jurists and of the imams and the onset of the era of the interpreters who were not jurists, with the termination of jurisprudence and with inflicting the severest punishment on jurists, with the increased distance between the ruler and the ruled—and, consequently, the increased suspicion between them—and with the ruler's resorting to the employment of foreign elements purchased as servants and then elevated to the rank of rulers. This is how the Mamelukes (al-mamalik which means owned slaves) infiltrated, gained strength and then seized power.

Those elements also made gains with the predominance of regional and family control over the spirit of fraternity and equality. Consequently, endless war erupted between countless mini-states and matters reached the point of seeking the help of foreign rulers against (each other), as happened in the Andalusian kingdoms for example.

The gains by the elements of degeneration were also made as a result of the abandonment of the tradition of the age of the Arab renaissance—an age which was confident of itself and which opened up to the world's civilizations and cultures to absorb, select and learn from them—and of the turn toward gradual isolation from the world. Let us take as an example the west in particular. The West was advancing, developing its sciences and enhancing its knowledge while we refused to learn what was happening around us until the West came to invade us one day with weapons which we didn't know, with sciences which we did not understand and with inventions about which we had not heard.

At other times, the elements of degeneration came from abroad. The Tatars were invading our world from the East, the Europeans were expelling us from Andalusia and from all the Mediterranean islands and the Ottoman onrush was reaching the gates of Vienna only to be defeated by corruption, opulence and tyranny.

The Mamelukes, the mercenaries, the slaves and the eunuchs ruled us before modern colonialism came with all its might to find everything torn into shreds.

Of course there did emerge after those early centuries great rulers, such as al-Zahir Baybars who repelled and defeated the Tatars in 'Ayn Jalut, great philosophers, such as Ibn Khaldun, or great voyagers, such as Ibn Batutah. But the marching darkness generally was stronger than those few flashing meteors.

Thus, it is not surprising to say that Islam is entering its 15th century while the Muslims are lagging nearly 10 centuries behind. Perhaps there are many who say: Even more.

At the time when Islam is entering the 15th century, one of the most important features of the international events is an "Islamic awakening" that has taken various--at times conflicting, at times confused and at times optimistic--forms so far.

This is because it is not easy to make up for centuries of backwardness and because there is no quick way for such compensation.

It is not the right of any ruler or leader to monopolize for himself the discovering of this way.

Necessary Foresight

However, there are acknowledged necessities if we really want to surmount this phase through the safest way:

We must look ahead and must reject any inclination that takes the Muslims back to waging battles that occurred almost 1,400 years ago.

What is surprising is that Islam is the only religion which has one undisputed basic text, namely the venerable Qur'an. Regardless of how far the interpretations and the opinions differ, it is unacceptable that the difference turn into a conflict when we have this firm and indisputable base.

The Islamic history must be rewritten with a critical scientific view that does not extend the sanctity of Islam itself to the behavior of thousands of Muslims who have alternately erred and been right.

We must realize that the starting point in development is man, that man is both heart and mind, that development is not skyscrapers, not the purchase of the latest weapons and not the possession of any kind of material things.

We must acknowledge that the human mind can only move in freedom and with persuasion, and that the human heart can only be won with love, dignity and respect.

To start with, we must restore to the Muslim the rights given him by the Qur'an. Islam proliferated through preaching and not through weapons. In Islam's age of prosperity, Islam's enemies were always stronger in weapons and weaker in argument.

The rights of the Muslim man are the starting point.

This is what erudition later defined under the name of human rights, such as the freedom of thinking, opinion and belief, liberty, fraternity and equality or democracy (consultation) and social justice.

Restoration of the sublime human values preached by Islam to the Muslim man without any pretexts or any apologies and the transformation of these values into detailed, applied and respected laws constitutes the start of the path.

Anything else is void and is nothing but emptiness.

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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ROMANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ARRIVE--Amman--(Ya'qub Muhammad), mufti of the Muslims in Romania, and Shaykh (Rajab Sali), the imam of Bucharest, arrived in Amman yesterday on a visit to Jordan at the invitation of the Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs and Holy Places. [Text] [JN041040 Amman AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 4 Dec 80 p 1]

ISLAMIC NEWS AGENCY FUTURE--Riyadh--Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz Khujah, Information Ministry undersecretary for information affairs and chairman of the Executive Council of the Islamic News Agency, yesterday had talks with agency director General Safdar 'Ali al-Qurayshi on future expansion plans for the agency. Dr Khujah stressed the need to continue to expand the activities of the Islamic News Agency in all spheres of news dissemination and coverage in order to cover the largest possible area of the world, according to a well organized stage-by-stage plan. It is worth noting that periodic high-level meetings are held regularly in order to supervise the progress of the agency offices established in Islamic capitals. It has been decided to increase the number of offices so as to cover all Islamic capitals and all major world media centers. The Islamic News Agency transmits for more than 9 hours daily and its daily output of approximately 10,000 words is currently received by 20 Islamic states. The agency also transmits a special daily bulletin in Spanish to 13 American states. [Text] [LD011541 Riyadh AL-JAZIRAH in Arabic 24 Nov 80 p 5]

CSO: 4802

POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS OF GUERRILLAS ANALYZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Nov 80 p 12

[Article by Thomas Ross: "Politicians and Fighters--Aspects of the War Against the Soviet Occupation Force in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Peshawar, Nov--"We fight under one single command; our command is called Islam," says the Afghan guerrilla fighter. His name is Mohammad Ibrahim and he is a member of the Yusufzai tribe. He has come to Pakistan for treatment of a bullet wound near the heart. Three days from now he will once again cross the mountains to resume the war against the Russians with his band. Ibrahim is a member of one of the smallest of those six political-religious organizations which, headquartered in Peshawar, have formed a quasi-official "Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan."

"Our common headquarters is called Islam"--this is the Mujahedin's favorite answer to the question of whether their fight would not show greater success if they had an integrated organization and a common command center. Since the start of the armed resistance against the communist regime in Kabul in July and August of 1978 the number of organizations has been on a constant increase. All attempts to combine them into a single entity have thus far been unsuccessful. A high Pakistani official is probably correct in stating: "Unity is contrary to the Afghan's character and their history."

Afghan resistance against the USSR is primarily plagued by two factors: The lack of weapons and ammunition and rivalry within its own ranks. While during the past 6 months various fighting units have attempted to coordinate their operations and to keep each other informed, mainly through messengers, about plans, offensive and defensive actions in several border provinces, particularly Kunar, Nangarhar and Paktia, politically effective cooperation is as remote as ever.

Today there are an estimated 30 different groupings, which we might as well call parties: The most active and well-known, and those best supplied with money and weapons, are the religious ones. The largest ones among them individually claim to represent the majority of the Afghan people. These claims can neither be substantiated nor investigated. Only one political representative in Peshawar, Shamsul of the "Afghan Millat," openly admits: "We do not represent the entire nation. But then no single party does."

Afghan Millat, who consider themselves social democrats, have in effect few adherents; but in Western and Indian eyes they have the advantage of being secularly oriented.

Three religious "parties" probably have the most members: the Hizb-e Islami, headed by young Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Gailani group and the Mujahid group. Both attract their members because they are entitled to call themselves a Pir, a sort of hereditary holy man; political figures are neither Gailani nor Mujahidi. On the other hand, Hekmatyar, a former student of engineering at Kabul University, is a passionate politician and while he is not a mullah, he is a devout Muslim, ideologically close to the Iranian fundamentalists who, until the outbreak of Iraqi-Iranian hostilities, had been supporting the Hizb-e Islami with money, weapons and also in a political sense.

The extent of control and leadership exercised by the political parties in Peshawar over the guerrilla bands in Afghanistan is more or less loose, depending on the individual organization. It is probably most effective in the Hizb-e Islami which undoubtedly is the most disciplined, best organized and ideologically the best motivated. However, armed resistance is still concentrated mostly among the Pashtun (Pathan) tribes and subsidiary tribes and among other ethnic communities: Hazara in the center, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkomans in the north.

The Hizb-e Islami is further distinguished from the rest by numbering among its adherents also some non-Pashtuns, especially in the north. One of the reasons for this is the fact that Hekmatyar's grandfather, a member of the Kharot tribe, had emigrated to Qonduz, a town a few miles from the Soviet border.

In refugee camps the "parties" are engaged in strong competitive efforts to attract adherents. Their rivalry is more pronounced in Pakistan where it often goes so far that members of one do not dare enter the territory of another. Occasionally there has been an exchange of rifle fire between two groups. Political rivalries are often superimposed upon traditional tribal or communal enmities in those cases.

The parties of course deny such altercations; they claim that ordinary bandits had misappropriated the honorary title of Mujahedin. But demands and claims of religious groups were partly responsible for the tragic outcome of several attempts at rebellion by regular Afghan troop units. During August 1979 the mutiny of Asmar garrison resulted in a bloodbath because of the Hizb-e Islami's attitude. Last January, a plan for the defection of units in Sukhrod (near Jalalabad) came to nothing because of the mullahs' attitude. Last October, units garrisoned at Pol-E-Charkhi, outside the Kabul city limits, had planned a mutiny and the assassination of Russian puppet President Babrak Karmal prior to his departure for Moscow. The plan shortly leaked out or was divulged by treachery and was aborted in a bloodbath by Soviet troops. Information about this, gathered from various sources, appears to be reliable.

Representatives of the political "parties" like to badmouth one another; mostly they speak badly, rarely well about the other. For instance, the so-called worldly groups accuse the mullahs of being stupid, naive and narrowminded. The mullahs as well as the Hizb-e Islami are accused of stubborn intolerance and of cruelty against dissenters based on ideological and religious fervor. On the other hand, there are among the mullahs fighting in Afghanistan men of great courage and effectiveness, like Mauvi Khalis, who leads a dissident Hizb faction in the Jalalabad region.

In Peshawar, religious groups of exiles are dominant. They receive most of the money and most of the support, primarily from the Arab states, from Iran (until

the start of the war) and from the small but influential Pakistani Muslim parties. From which side the support of Afghan "exile parties" comes depends upon their ideological orientation. Additional importance is given by the Pakistanis to those parties willing to recognize the Durand Line, drawn during British colonial times, as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only a tiny minority is of course willing to do so.

Since the beginnings of the resistance against the communist regime in Kabul, the USSR and its allies as well as nonaligned India accuse the Pakistani Government of furnishing weapons and training to the guerrilla fighters. Not the smallest evidence exists for this to date. True, the Mujahedin are today often better equipped with rifles than units of the Pakistani Army. Their unintentional supplier is the Soviet Union. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers have defected to the Mujahedin in the past year with their weapons, mostly Kalashnikov AK 78s. The Mujahedin have looted arsenals and they have attacked military convoys-- Afghan ones and apparently also small Soviet ones.

However, the guerilla fighters may have gotten their hands on light weapons, but hardly any heavy or defensive ones, probably because the Russians have distributed such weapons with great care and only to reliable Afghan units. In a few cases the Mujahedin were successful in capturing a few antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Out of fear of provoking the USSR Government, neither the Pakistani Government, nor the Arab states, nor China are furnishing weapons to the Mujahedin. That at least is the impression one gains from observation and conversations within the crisis area.

One of the main worries of the Mujahedin is the chronic lack of ammunition. True, there are shops or rather huts, in the village bazaars of the Pakistani tribal area where old-fashioned guns and ammunition of various calibers can be bought. Large caliber bullets cost the equivalent of DM 40 per dozen; a fortune for an Afghan. Besides, there is a need for tons of ammunition, not just a few boxes.

Despite the contempt in which many guerrilla fighters hold the representatives of the "political parties" in Peshawar (they like to call them "political merchants"), the parties play an important role. They serve to establish contact with foreign countries, to procure money and food, and to establish coordination. Afghan resistance shares with the freedom movements of the former colonies, from the 1950's up to the time of Zimbabwe, not only the division of effort between politicians in exile and guerrilla fighters in the occupied homeland, but also the frequently tense relationship between the two parties. But never before has dissension been so great.

This fragmentation is a reflection of the variety inherent in Afghan, especially Pashtuni, society. Every ruler in Kabul and, in other times the British from Delhi, have used this fragmentation for their own purposes, bought tribes and incited them against one another. Karmal's predecessor, Amin, attempted to do this also, but with little success. Karmal sent the minister for border and tribal matters, Lt Col Faiz Mohammad, formerly minister of the interior in the government of President Daud who was assassinated in 1978, along with some high-ranking officers to Paktia, to the Jadran tribe. Apart from money, the minister also brought sheep, turbans and clothing. A banquet was prepared. However, the minister was unable to enjoy it,

because the Jadran considered this attempt to buy them as an insult to their honor and killed him.

Nothing is known about additional attempts to buy tribes on the part of the communist government. It appears that hate of the Russians and of their puppet regime headed by Babrak Karmal is so passionate and so unanimous that while it may be possible to by certain individuals, no tribes will let themselves be wooed by the communists.

9273

CSO: 4403

PREPARATIONS FOR WINTER BEHIND FRONTLINE

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 23 Nov 80 p 2

[Article: "Iraqi Engineers and Workers Build Anti-flood Embankments Behind the Frontline"]

[Text] There is brisk civilian activity going on behind the battle front in the southern sector. Bulldozers, shovels and other earth-moving and road-building machinery and equipment are busy building flood-control embankments and bunds to protect communications links for Iraqi troops.

These massive building operations have made considerable progress and are reaching as far as Ahwaz area where the rattle of earth-moving machines and vehicles are mingling with the bursts of explosions and the thud of artillery. The will and determination of Iraqi building workers are as powerful as that of their warriors.

We met Mr Alaa Hameed al-Barrak, Chairman of the State Organization for the Operation and Maintenance of Irrigation Projects, during a tour of the work sites. He said the building of these embankments and bunds were decided in the light of careful calculations to preclude the danger of floods or heavy rainfall in the winter season.

"They are precautionary measures against the opening of Dez reservoir and flooding of Karun and Karkha rivers which may lead to inundating the roads," Mr Barrak added. "The length of the principal embankment now nearing completion is 95 kilometres. Work is divided into four sections under supervision of four technical directors from the Ministry of Irrigation."

Mr Barrak said that the Ministry of Irrigation already mobilized all its resources to get the project implemented on schedule. An engineer in one of the advanced sites said he felt much honored to take part in the battle by means of the construction of embankments to protect communication links for the Iraqi Army.

The high enthusiasm of workers and engineers on the projects provides confidence that the project should be completed in a record period. A trade union committee chief said all workers felt deeply honored and fortunate to undertake implementation of the project. A worker on the site said everybody is prepared for any sacrifice and undertaking any task.

A Kurdish worker said he came from the Kirkuk Irrigation Department to volunteer with his colleagues for taking part in Qadissiyat Saddam Battle. He hoped to be able to take part in any combat action on the battle field as well.

IRAQ

BRIEFS

OIL PUMPING RESUMED--The pumping of Iraqi oil from northern Iraq across Syria to Tripoli refinery has resumed. The pumping operations had been halted since the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war. [Text] [NC071536 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1515 GMT 7 Dec 80]

FREE HOUSING FOR SURVIVORS--The Revolution Command Council [RCC] has decided to grant a house or an apartment to the wife and children of armed forces martyrs as well as to the parents of an unmarried martyr in whatever province they choose and without rent. The RCC has also decided to settle the loans on the mortgaged house or apartment of a martyr and to grant the residence to the martyr's wife and children. [Text] [JN110800 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 10 Dec 80]

LEBANESE KURDISH PARTY--Baghdad, 10 Dec (INA)--The Kurdish Democratic Party in Lebanon has hailed the victories being achieved by the Iraqi army in the battle of honor and dignity against the Persian aggressors. This was contained in a cable received by President Saddam Husayn from Jamil Mahu, the party's secretary general. In his cable, he stressed that the homicide and massacres committed against the Iranian Kurds were no less atrocious than those perpetrated against the other Iranian peoples by the hands of the ignorant Persian clique in Iran. He added that the Persian racists have unjustly tortured the Iranian peoples, particularly our brother Kurds in Iran's Kordestan. He stressed the party's support for Iraq in defending its legitimate national and patriotic rights against the hateful Persian regime, as represented in the ignorant clique and the new agents of U.S. imperialism, Zionism and reaction in the region. Mahu is currently on a visit to Iraq. [Text] [JN101913 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1750 GMT 10 Dec 80]

STUDENTS UNION WITHDRAWS--Baghdad, 9 Dec (INA)--The National Union of Iraqi Students [NUIS] has decided to suspend its membership in the International Students Federation [ISF] and to withdraw from the organizations which belong to the federation. This came in a statement by Muhammad Dubdub, chairman of the NUIS Executive Bureau, who added that the NUIS attended the ISF conference held in Berlin on 18-24 November and noticed that there was a current within the ISF which sought to wipe out the democratic formulas and to impose an extremist political line on a number of world students organizations that are members of the ISF. Muhammad Dubdub said that this current

penetrating the ISF organizations revealed its hostility to those students organizations which have an independent national policy and which represent broad student masses in their own countries. Dubdub said that the ISF has accepted as members organizations which represent only themselves because of their absence from the national struggles in their own countries. Muhammad Dubdub also said that the withdrawal of the Iraqi union had a positive effect on the nonaligned and progressive student forces and organizations in the world. The Yugoslav students organization, the Moroccan students union and a number of student bodies in Asia, Africa and Latin America also withdrew from the ISF and affirmed their independent line and their struggle by the various legitimate formulas and channels to express their independent opinions. Mr Muhammad Dubdub headed the NUIS delegation to the ISF conference. [Text] [JN091904 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1700 GMT 9 Dec 80]

CSO: 4802

DAYAN DEFINES VITAL INTERESTS TO BE PRESERVED IN AUTONOMY PLAN

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 pp 9-10, 24

[Interview with MK Moshe Dayan]

[Text] MK Moshe Dayan does not conceal the fact that he is accustomed to changing his opinions. He does not even regard this as a reason for embarrassment. To cling to old views whose time has past during a period of rapidly changing circumstances -- this is not one of the qualities of a diplomat of stature.

The nucleus remains solid, and perhaps this is the essence: no Palestinian state. The IDF retains the right to be anywhere in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Israel must settle anywhere it considers to be proper, but the settlements must be true ones, deeply-rooted, and not fictitious. We must not impose Israeli sovereignty on the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza against their will, and we must not annex these territories with their inhabitants to Israel.

On these principles there is no compromise. As for the methods of implementation, realization, and application, there are changing solutions in changing circumstances of time, and they have as many shades, delicatenesses, and sensitivities as the fertile imagination can produce.

We hosted MK Moshe Dayan in the editorial office of MA'ARIV. He was in good spirits. Except for some strong tea and milk, he avoided all the food and drink delicacies. The MA'ARIV participants in the conversation were: Shmuel Shnitzer, Moshe Zak, Shalom Rosenfeld, Yuval Elitzur, Dov Goldstein, Ido Dissentchik, Levi Yitzhaq Hayerushalmi, Avraham Tirosh, and Menahem Talmi.

Shmuel Shnitzer: I want to formally welcome Moshe Dayan -- a controversial personality, against whom all kinds of things can be said, but for whom one must always say that he is an interesting personality, an original thinker. Even when this thought is not unanimously accepted, it is impossible to say that it is not stimulating, that it is not innovative. We will use this opportunity to hear reactions and positions on various controversial questions.

[Question] Let's begin with the recent development -- the war between Iran and Iraq. Does this war prove that there is no Islamic unity, that there is no pan-Islamism? Can the conclusion be drawn from this war that actually we are not exactly the main cause for all the conflicts in the Middle East but rather that

there are other no less important and perhaps more dangerous factors than the Arab-Israeli conflict? What is your estimate of the prospects of the war if it will not be terminated by outside intervention? Which of the two sides can be hurt, and where does this lead the Middle East?

[Answer] In my opinion, Iraq is much stronger today than Iran. It was also stronger than Iran in the past in spite of Iran's past quantitative advantages both in people and in weapons. I had the impression from talks which I had in Iran and with other parties, and also from Israeli estimates by those who are qualified to make them, that Iraq was stronger.

This is certainly true today. The Iranian army is crumbling. Many generals have been removed and even executed. Many of the radar installations which were of a first-rate quality as long as they were under the responsibility and care of the Americans have gone down the drain in one form or another.

Iraq, on the other hand, has many Soviet advisors, and it is dependent on the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union, Iraq is a first-rate asset. It is a land bridge from the Soviet Union to the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have always attached much importance to this, and in this respect they do not have another ally. In Iraq the army is not in a state of disintegration and chaos, and it is backed by a big power for the supply of weapons, guidance, and a threat as if it has said: I, the Soviet Union, as an official or unofficial ally of Iraq, am likely to intervene if you attack her. The Russians have formulations, which are known to all of us, that this front threatens the security of the Soviet Union, the events are taking place along its southern border, and so forth. All of this is happening at a time when Iran is involved in a conflict with the United States, the only power which can create a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.

I have no doubt that without Iraq's manifest superiority, it would not have taken the initiative which it did. It considered this time to be appropriate and convenient. As long as Iran will not find a way to communicate with the United States so that it will create a balance of power against the Soviet Union, Iran will not be able to defeat Iraq. Instead, Iraq, in one way or another, will give it a beating.

[Question] Is it perhaps possible that there will be some kind of reversal, as occurred in the Ethiopian-Somali war, in which Iran would turn precisely to the Soviet Union?

[Answer] At the moment I do not think that this is possible. The Soviet Union is tied to Iraq. It is difficult to assume that it would change sides. It has commitments to Iraq, and for Iraq, this question is very important. I assume that before Iraq launched the war, it consulted with the Soviet Union.

[Question] Do you think that it acted with the approval of the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Yes. There was also an official announcement by the Soviet Union that it supports the Iraqis in this conflict.

[Question] If the dispute between the United States and Iran were to be resolved, does the United States have the logistic capability to balance the forces, or is its capability limited to a verbal threat?

[Answer] I believe that it has such a capability. It has been for a long time now that the United States has drawn for itself a red line for the protection of the American interests in the Middle East, which include oil. In my opinion, beyond this red line, the United States will be ready to use military force. This encompasses its interests in energy and other main security matters such as strategic lines on the border with the Soviet Union.

[Question] And this includes geographically the Arabian Peninsula, the southern Persian Gulf, and not its northern part?

[Answer] I believe so. The United States is unable to and does not want to impose itself on any country which does not request it to do so -- in contrast to what the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan. The United States would not do this even if its inaction in a certain country would cause it actual or strategic damage such as the loss of warning facilities on the Soviet border in Turkey or Iran or in the matter of oil.

It will not impose itself, however if that country appeals to it, and it is not a member of the Warsaw Pact (such as Poland or East Germany) but a country which still does not have any formal identification with one of the big powers, then even if it will be very disturbing to the Soviet Union, the United States, in my opinion, would use force to protect vital interests. In regard to means, first of all, I believe that the United States has the logistic means. Secondly, the question will be between the Soviet Union and the United States: to where is the one and from where is the other. In Iran, which at the moment is a kind of neutral territory, the United States would be prepared to endanger itself, in my opinion, if Iran appealed to it. It would say: "It belongs to me. The Iranians have appealed to me, and I have responded." It would then demand that the Soviet Union remove itself and its "clients" from this territory, and they would find a solution to the questions by the creation of neutral sectors in such a piece of land or another. However, essentially, it would intervene if Iran asks it, and it would be able to bring a balance between the two forces by the very threat of its intervention. That is to say: it would say to the Russians, "if you enter the conflict, we will also enter. Please stay out of this problem."

Another thing regarding the question of the military capability of the United States: the fact that the United States does not have an appropriate level of conventional forces stems, in my opinion, more from the United States' unwillingness to intervene in various insignificant disputes, and therefore it does not have such forces. The contrary version, which holds that because it does not have such forces, it is unable to intervene in all kinds of disputes and it was unable to act in Iran and other places, is incorrect.

This means that if the United States wants to adopt a policy of intervention in a local conflict, which requires conventional forces, the technical question of establishing this force is no problem for it. It would establish such forces.

[Question] Can a country in a region of conflict exist without the backing of a big power?

[Answer] Are you referring to a specific country?

[Answer] Can we be neutral, or are we dependent upon a big power and forced to rely on it to guarantee our existence?

[Answer] I do not know what you mean by "rely on." I will define this more precisely. In my opinion, we can exist here even when the conflict is at its height, when the Arab and Islamic countries are against us, without military intervention by the United States on our behalf, and even whenever the United States does not use its full political importance, such as its not casting a veto at the last session of the Security Council. However, we would be unable to do this successfully if the United States would also stop selling us weapons. As long as the United States is ready (and as of now it is ready) to sell us weapons, and the question is only one of operating them, -- then, in my opinion, Israel can hold its own and repel attacks against it even when we are faced with an unfavorable balance of forces and a multifaceted Arab build-up. All of this depends, of course, on the Russians not taking an active part in the war.

[Question] Isn't the need to depend on a big power the result of the intervention of another big power on behalf of the other side?

[Answer] In a certain time this was the case. That is to say, the main motivation of the United States in helping us was not only the fear that without it we would collapse, and the United States is committed to our existence. Instead, it was more than this. She was confronted with the question of the Phantom versus the Mig and the lessons involved in that in terms of its interest.

This was evident in the last two wars in the Middle East, in 1967 and 1973, when the Soviet Union threatened to come to the aid of Syria in 1967 and to the aid of Egypt in 1973 (when the Third Army was surrounded and we were close to Cairo, the Soviet Union said then that it would send Russian airborne divisions). The American response to the Soviets was: "If you go in, we will also go in." Johnson said this more sharply, even though the Soviets had not threatened then to use nuclear weapons: "I am sending the Sixth Fleet, and it is armed with nuclear weapons."

In 1973 when the Soviets said that they would send forces to defend Cairo and to help supply the encircled Third Army, the Americans said, "If you go in, we will also go in."

I mentioned two examples in the area of American intervention in both of which the essential interest was American both in terms of the test of the Phantom against the Mig and the direct American intervention against the Soviet threat.

[Question] Was this actually a test of the Phantom against the Mig or a test of the Phantom against the missile?

[Answer] If you are referring to the anti-aircraft missile, the SAM, in my opinion, the Phantom cannot win such battles. Not the Phantom and not our aircraft. The Americans were unsuccessful in combat involving the aircraft against the surface-to-air missiles in the Viet Nam War. Therefore, aircraft should not be permitted to be destroyed in their attempts to overcome the missiles. Ground elements must be introduced into the battle. Frequently, the air arm must be removed for certain and

even lengthy periods of time from the area of armor or infantry combat in the knowledge that the aircraft cannot participate significantly in this area because the missiles would shoot them down.

[Question] Let's return to the political side. Do you see some threshold beyond which we would endanger American support in weapons supply, or is it possible to move calmly here to the end?

[Answer] I see such a threshold, and it changes from time to time. There were times when the Americans stopped supplying weapons to Israel. There were times when they threatened us, such as in 1957 when Eisenhower and Bulganin warned us as well as the British and the French that if we did not evacuate the Sinai, they would use force against us. In such a case, of course, one cannot talk about aid to Israel. Even during Truman's time, during the War of Independence, we did not receive weapons from the United States because they said that their policy was not to intervene in regions where there were conflicts. Ford and Kissinger also suspended the supply of weapons to Israel in 1975 during the time of the policy of "reassessment."

What happened in the past can happen again. At the moment, in my opinion, the Camp David Agreement is a framework which also commits the Americans. As long as we essentially do not violate the Camp David Agreement in substantive matters and do not deviate from it, we are, in my opinion, on solid ground in our relations with the Americans, and just to convince you, it must be remembered that Resolution 242 was adopted in 1967. Thirteen years have passed and it is still a sacred cow.

The ink on the Camp David Agreement and its annexes which the United States signed as a witness has still not dried. One of the annexes is a memorandum of understanding between the United States and us in which there are American commitments. The entire agreement and this memorandum was approved by the American congress, and at least for the foreseeable future, I do not believe that the Americans will violate it or that we would damage our relations with the United States -- unless we do not fulfill our part of this agreement and work against American interests.

Moreover, even if the American interests change in respect to them and are not in accord with that which is stated in the Camp David Agreement - in the framework agreement -- the Americans would consider themselves committed to us and would sell us weapons as long as we fulfill our part of this agreement.

For example, the settlements issue: we have disagreements with the United States, not as deep as they appear on the outside, but they exist, or regarding East Jerusalem. However, since in the Camp David Agreement, there are no specific definitions of these issues and it cannot be claimed that we are violating commitments stemming from the agreement -- in my opinion, the current Israeli policy on these issues will not bring the United States to a situation in which it would say that it will not sell us weapons.

On the other hand, if we act in a way which is substantially contrary to the Agreement and violates it, we can cross the threshold, and they can say: if you want to work against us, do not expect us to supply you with weapons.

[Question] Is it true that at the basis of our agreement with Egypt there was a conception that we would give up the Sinai and get Judea and Samaria, that this was the basic assumption of our entire deal with Egypt, and that all of this took place in your first talk with Hassan Tuhani in Morocco?

[Answer] Never! This is absurd! In the talk with Tuhani, the possibility of arranging a meeting between Begin and al-Sadat was discussed. The Palestinian issue was not discussed at all. At certain times, the Egyptians, and primarily and perhaps only al-Sadat, expressed and used such formulations from which it was possible to conclude that in the Palestinian issue, al-Sadat only needed a "fig leaf" and no more.

I never heard such an expression from him. On the contrary, I heard him say that the emphasis is on not making a separate agreement, and on this there were disputes and stubbornness. There was a suspension of the talks, and there was the big argument over the famous Section 6.

I will say parenthetically that now when I hear or read about what is happening, I hear about some Israeli "conception" which says: "The Egyptians do not want to continue to discuss the autonomy issue, so we will not withdraw from the Sinai." Don't we remember our argument against "linkage?" What has happened here? Just a short while ago we were afraid that the Egyptians would tie the agreement of Israel and Egypt to that which was happening in the Palestinian issue. Can we say now that if the Egyptians separate the two issues, we do not want to implement the Israeli-Egyptian agreement? Of course, official institutions are not saying this, but such talk is being heard.

Another matter requires clarification:

When the Egyptians say that they do not want a separate peace with us, who are actually the others referred to? At this time, one cannot speak about Syria because of the relations between Egypt and Syria, which are not good; therefore, the reference is to Jordan and the Palestinians. Actually, we have no conflict with the Kingdom of Jordan. Its boundaries are clear -- the Jordan River and other agreed upon lines, and in no place are we east of this border.

The dispute with Jordan is on the issue of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and it is identified with the Palestinian issue. When Egypt says that it does not want or is unable to make a separate agreement with us, it means a territorial agreement or settlement on the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The issue, therefore, is one, but it involves two entities: Jordan and the Palestinians.

[Question] Al-Sadat initially insisted that the autonomy talks must be concluded by May 1980. Now he has suspended the autonomy talks for the fifth time. It seems that he is in no hurry. Is this just a matter of tactics, that is to say he wants to defer the resumption of the talks until after the elections in the United States this November, or has there been a change in his position? If you were in the cabinet today, would you recommend pressure for the continuation of the autonomy talks?

[Answer] I can tell tales out of school. When Yitzhaq Rabin returned from his talks with al-Sadat, he telephoned me -- and he doesn't do this often -- and said: "I want to tell you that al-Sadat repeated word for word what you had been saying

regarding the Palestinians. It was tape recorded and will be publicized." Al-Sadat has degraded the importance of the Israeli-Egyptian-American talks on this issue. He has said why is it important if we decide to resume the talks?

In my opinion, his conduct now is one of tactics. He, as I, does not believe that the solution lies in the Israeli-Egyptian-American talks but rather in the talks with the Palestinians. However, to the extent that there must be an American-Israeli-Egyptian understanding, he is in no hurry. He has two dates: one, the elections in America and two, the completion of the evacuation of the Sinai by our forces. He can therefore say: Good, these talks which are not leading to anything, can continue or not continue provided that their disruption by the Egyptians will not damage Egypt's relations with the United States and will not give the Israelis an excuse for not completing the withdrawal.

[Question] Permit me to remind you that on 12 June 1977, before you joined the Likud government, you were interviewed by BBC and at that time, you brought up the idea of "Arab autonomy in the West Bank under Israeli supervision, the Arabs having their own parliament and conducting their own affairs, and Israel concerning itself only with security matters."

[Answer] Today I would not define it as a parliament. The definition that I use today is to permit the Arabs to administer their own affairs. We must say to them administer your own affairs provided that our vital interests are protected. What are our vital interests? First of all, that there be no independent Palestinian Arab state. Our autonomy proposal refers to an administrative council -- "self-rule" and in parentheses, administrative council. I would say that they should administer their own affairs. For example, this forum should consist of 12 to 18 people, however if they decide that they want to meet in a broader forum, can we prevent them from doing so?

Today I would not use the term parliament because it is like an expression of political independence, and I did not propose this even then because I was talking about Israeli control in matters of security and foreign affairs in the West Bank, that is to say under no circumstances an independent state.

In my opinion, we are today in a situation in which we must, for our own good and as soon as possible, remove our imposed rule over the Arabs. I emphasize "imposed" because it is possible that when we come to a certain city such as Gaza or Bethlehem and offer to remove and eliminate our rule, they will say to us: "Do not impose chaos on us." Then we will say: "If you request us to continue to administer your affairs, we are prepared to do this." However, vis-a-vis the world, ourselves and the Palestinian Arabs, it is in our interests not to impose ourselves on them but not to give them the right to administer our affairs or to adversely affect our vital interests which today are: the settlements in the territories, exclusive security (that is to say, the IDF will be anywhere it considers appropriate and only the IDF, and no other army, will be there), the right to purchase land, and the nonestablishment of a Palestinian state. We must not permit them to plant the seeds from which later the plant of a Palestinian state would sprout on its own.

[Question] You are proposing that unilateral action be taken and that the Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip be permitted to administer their independent lives as long as the vital interests of the State of Israel are not adversely affected. How do you define the vital interests of Israel?

[Answer] I have said that the IDF, and only the IDF, be anywhere it considers appropriate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Secondly, there be no Palestinian state. Thirdly, the right of Israelis to purchase and acquire land there be guaranteed. Fourthly, the right to settle, maintain, and expand the existing settlements and to establish others or additional ones. These are the things. If there is land and the government of Israel considers it proper to establish a settlement, the settlement should be established. For this, one needs the government which has a majority in the Knesset, and it will decide the policy on this issue.

[Question] Are you saying only with the authorization of the government?

[Answer] Yes, absolutely.

When I said that the gap between the Americans and us, for example in the issue of settlements, is not as deep or as sharp as it appears. I was referring to Carter's conception which he has repeated from time to time and which says: every Israeli has the right to purchase land and to establish his home anywhere he wants to in the West Bank. This is one issue. Another thing is a policy of colonization where on the basis of this policy the government wants to extend its control or increase its influence in the West Bank, and there are those who say actually to bring about an Israelization of the West Bank.

When Carter emphasizes that every Israeli has the right to live anywhere in the West Bank and in Gaza, to purchase land, and build a home, I would not propose that the Government of Israel be less Zionist than him and say: "Every Jew does not have the automatic right to purchase land and build a home." However, I am speaking about policy, that is to say the establishment of an entire settlement (and not individual action of one kind or another) which subsequently requires protection of that settlement and the provision of services and which creates a political reality. In this matter, everyone must be bound by government policy and settlements must not be established without its consent. However, if a Jew came and said: "I have purchased a house in Shekhem, and I want to live there," I would say: "In my opinion, Jews do not have to live in Shekhem. If you want to live in Shekhem, live there, but don't come to me in the morning and say: what about the children, what about the stone throwing, and what about the fact that they burned my car?"

[Question] Why do you nevertheless describe the right to purchase land as a vital interest?

[Answer] I am not speaking about individuals. I am speaking about the fact that the State wants to establish a settlement. I want to make a distinction between an individual right and government policy. We must have the right to buy land in the West Bank because otherwise the leadership in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza can make a decision which prevents or prohibits Arabs from selling land. I believe there is a possibility of purchasing land. Therefore, if the government wants to establish a settlement in a certain region and wants to buy land for this purpose, it is necessary that the agreement between the Palestinian Arabs and us be such that they will not be authorized or permitted to cast a veto. They can persuade an Arab not to sell his land, but their rights to administer their lives as they choose must not include the right to pass a law or institute an administrative regulation which prohibits Arabs from selling land.

[Question] But for what purpose do we need land there?

[Answer] In order to establish settlements.

[Question] We are now touching upon a subject which is at the very heart of the dispute and which is causing all the severe arguments among us. There is a consensus among all the broad groups of the people regarding the IDF's right to be located and function freely in these territories. There is no dispute on this. In contrast, there is a dispute if the establishment of settlements is really such a vital interest. Why is it a vital interest of the State of Israel to establish settlements in Judea and Samaria?

[Answer] In my opinion, it is necessary, desirable, and vital that we have settlements -- solidly based and deeply rooted, true and not fictitious settlements -- in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. When I speak about fictitious settlements, I mean that a settlement next to Shekhem, even if it is established sincerely, with its sources of employment in Jerusalem, is a settlement which can stand on its own feet only if industry is established there.

During the next period of time, settlements must be established selectively in blocs: the Jordan Valley, the greater Jerusalem region, and Gush Etzion. Ma'ale Adumim can belong to the Jerusalem region, however I am not speaking now about the Jericho-Jerusalem line but rather about Jerusalem outside the Israeli sovereign sector. In addition, the Jerusalem region must extend across the plateau to certain areas which have security importance because anti-aircraft warning stations are located there -- Ba'al Hatzor and its vicinity. And in the Gaza Strip -- the fruit-picking [areas]. These are the things which I consider vital today, and in my opinion, necessary to us.

[Question] You did not include Samaria?

[Answer] The partition for me is not Judea and Samaria, but rather wherever yes and wherever no. I do not think it is necessary to establish a settlement, and certainly not an isolated one, on Jabal Kabir next to Shekhem. I am not contradicting my view that settlements must be established selectively. There are places where they must not be. In the places where they must be established, this must be done in blocs. Additional Israeli settlements must be established in the Jordan Valley. I proposed in the cabinet, and the proposal was adopted, that a water pipeline be extended from the Kinneret and southward through Bet She'an and Tirat Zevi.

The settlements are required for two reasons. The first is security and the second is our connection to the Land of Israel. The security reason has two aspects: in order that an Arab state not be established, it is necessary that there not be a homogeneous Arab settlement there. If there is a general Arab homogeneous settlement, it will be difficult to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In terms of security, I believe that it will be very difficult to justify the presence of the IDF in these areas over a long period of time if it is also not based on the fact that there is an Israeli population there, not numerically equivalent to the Arab one but that there is an Israeli population there. This is Israel's interest.

[Question] Doesn't this constitute annexation?

[Answer] No. The same thing, but in a reverse way, applies also to the Arab settlements in Judea and Samaria. They can, if they want to, be tied to Jordan and the Jordanian parliament in the autonomy period. In this matter, I have a different opinion than that of the government. If the Arab settlements say: "We do not want to establish a ministry of education for ourselves; we want to be bound by the Jordanian ministry of education" -- this is acceptable to me. In my opinion, this is a mutual right: Qirat Arba is connected to the government of Israel, elects to the Knesset, and receives funds like Afula and Kafr Saba whereas Shekhem and Gaza (if they so desire) are connected to the Government of Jordan and receive funds from it -- provided that this does not mean Jordanian sovereignty over these settlements. Therefore, this is not annexation but rather mutual integration. This is to say that the various settlements can, if they so desire, be connected to the relevant governments.

Why are the settlements required? Because I do not want to see the actual borders of Israel along the green line. And the significance of borders not along the green line is the possibility of maintaining an army and establishing settlements in their areas up to Jordan and the international border with Egypt. This must be Israel's future map (we are not discussing the Golan Heights now), and therefore, I do not think that Israel can maintain such a map without settlement in blocs and one which really stands on its own feet. To the one who believes that Israel can be satisfied (or must be satisfied) with a map of the green line, which is also the result of war, the settlements are not necessary and there is no requirement for the IDF to be on secure borders.

[Question] Your map is actually the Allon Plan...

[Answer] Would that Allon, of blessed memory, had accepted this plan. He spoke about sovereign partition and a border with Jordan which would split the West Bank in some place. I am speaking about the fact that we have a right, which no one can block, to settle up to the Jordan, that the IDF can be in any place it wants to be, and that there be no sovereignty -- of an independent Palestinian state or the Government of Jordan -- in these territories. These are two different concepts. One says: Divide it. The second says: No, we will live side by side without a sovereign partition.

I said earlier that in my opinion, the disagreements on settlements are not so sharp. When one examines practically the locations which must be settled and where to dismantle and where not to dismantle existing settlements, the differences between the Alignment and the Likud are marginal. All of these blocs were generally established by the Alignment as blocs. I do not know what its platform will be for the elections to the next Knesset. For this Knesset it again endorsed this urban and rural settlement.

At the recent convention of Hakibbutz Hame'uhad [National Kibbutz Movement], they repeated this concept while mentioning these areas which are permanent settlements (and I am not speaking now about the Golan Heights). There are differences of opinion regarding certain places, including a distinction between densely populated and thinly populated regions. However, when you try to identify these places, then the dispute narrows to Shilo, Shekhem 'Illit, and several other such places.

[Question] In a book which was recently published in the United States, the author claims that Israel sank the American ship Liberty during the Six-Day War even though it knew that it was an American spy ship. A Senate committee will investigate the matter. You were the minister of defense then. What happened?

[Answer] I welcome the Senate investigation. I prefer the Senate to investigate and reach authoritative conclusions rather than all kinds of reporters and their collaborators making guesses.

In regard to the incident itself, as far as I remember, our forces made a mistake in the identification of the ship, and they bombed it until the error was revealed. Our forces did not bomb it because it was engaged in intelligence but rather because they did not identify it as an American ship, and after the mistake became known, they received instructions to stop the bombing.

Basically, in our relations with the Americans -- and I can say this for all the periods of time when I served in governments of Israel -- there was virtually no question which they asked to which we did not respond with the truth. We said to ourselves: We must see to it that everything is clean and open between the Americans and us. This does not only apply to what we did to the American ship but also if they were to ask tomorrow in regard to Lebanon as to which weapons were used, we would say: such and such weapons -- so that we would not come to a situation in which we would say: "We do not want to tell you," and they would say: "If so, then it is possible that they were American weapons." It is not worth it to get into such a situation, and it is preferable for us to say, if it was the reality, "American weapons" -- and afterwards to discuss the essence of the matter as to whether or not we had violated in this way some commitment.

Had we known that the Liberty was an American Intelligence ship, not only would we not have bombed it under any circumstances but also we would not have concealed from the Americans that which was taking place on the battlefield. If the American military attache had come and asked us what was happening on the Port Said front, we would have said we have such and such forces, the Egyptians have such and such forces, and that is the combat picture.

[Question] If the Arabs, and especially Iraq where the danger appears to be concrete, were to have nuclear weapons, would we be able to exist then on the basis of a balance of fear, as exists in the global sense?

[Answer] I will not go into definitions of a balance of fear.

To Israel's publicized formal statement that we will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, I want to add that we also must not come late.

[Question] With your permission, we will move to another area. What was so improper in this government that you saw fit to resign from it, and what are your future plans?

[Answer] I did not leave the government because it was not functioning properly.

I will answer part of the question, and I will not respond to the other part. It is not my custom to criticize others. It is my custom to state what must be done.

There were differences of opinion between the government, or the majority in the government, and me on the issue of the negotiations with the Palestinians and a solution to the Palestinian problem. I will tell you what the differences were and what the technical part was.

The differences of opinion were on the issue which we have just discussed. I believe that Israeli policy must be such that we do not impose Israeli sovereignty against the will of the Arabs who reside in the region between the Jordan River and the green line, except for Jerusalem.

When the discussions of the agreement with Egypt were completed and they began to discuss the application of the autonomy plans, differences of opinion on this issue became evident already from the first step. Even if there is to be no manifestation in the first 5 years of autonomy, we must know where the road which we are taking is leading us. The road in the first 5 years of the transition period -- in which I believe Begin's statement that he would not deviate from that which is stated in the Camp David Agreements -- is so broad that from Israel's point of view, we must know what we are aspiring to. When you take the first step, you want to know where you will be with the future steps.

I believe that we must aspire to a situation in which Israeli sovereignty will be imposed on this territory only with the agreement of the Arabs. This means that we must say to them: "We are preventing you from realizing your aspiration for the establishment of the Palestinian state. Even if you want this, it will not come about. We will not sign such an agreement. This is not included in the Camp David Agreement. If you do this in contravention to the agreement, we will use force and prevent it. However, at the same time, we assure you we will not make you become part of Israel without your consent." Therefore, the reality must be such that we will not force them to become Israelis, and we will not permit them to convert this territory into a Palestinian state.

This point must be expressed in all the actions which we take during the negotiations on the basis of legislation and also in the decisions of the government on the question of the settlements -- where to settle and where not to settle.

There were differences of opinion on this issue, and no one will deny it. The Likud went to the elections with a platform which stated that Israeli sovereignty must be imposed from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan. It is no wonder, therefore, that the ears of the members of the government -- headed by the prime minister -- were receptive to this demand, to see this as a final objective. I never agreed to this, and I was assured before I joined the government that it would not be done. In truth, this was not scheduled in the framework of the government's timetable just as I was assured that the new government would continue to prevent Jews from praying on the Temple Mount, beyond the Gate of the Mughrebins. I read in a newspaper that the police prevented a group of Jews from praying there despite the fact that during the period of Golda's government, it was the Herut people who demanded this and who also attempted to enter there and pray.

However, in the autonomy issue, there was a need to look beyond the 5-year transition period, and on this point there were differences of opinion between the government and me.

This matter also had a practical-technical implication. In regard to the conduct of the autonomy negotiations, it was clear to me that the government and the prime minister did not want to let me conduct these negotiations authoritatively and substantively, not only formally. That is to say that they did not want that I, together with other ministers, should work up proposals on the basis of the government decisions and bring them for government approval, as was the case in the peace negotiations with the Egyptians in which there were two or three ministers. At that time we would bring proposals, which at times were adopted and which at times were rejected by the government (Ezer and I or Ezer, Begin, and I -- but no more than that).

When it came to the autonomy issue, my situation was as follows: either I had to agree to the proposal that I be chairman of a committee, the opinions and aims of whose members were different than mine, or that I not participate in the negotiations and continue to be a member of the government and be involved with the ministry of foreign affairs without being involved in the main issue of our policy, which is tied to our relations with the Americans, the Arabs, and Europe.

I saw no reason to continue as a member of the government.

[Question] Were you in agreement with the government policy on domestic affairs?

[Answer] What are domestic affairs? The economy? I actually was not involved in it. That is to say I was not satisfied with the results, with the inflation, and so forth. However, as to whether or not it was necessary to permit the acquisition of foreign currency, I really did not have an opinion on this matter.

[Question] What are your plans?

[Answer] If the elections to the Knesset were being held today or if the lists for the Knesset had to be submitted today, and I had to decide, there is no shadow of a doubt that I would not go to the next Knesset in any combination.

[Question] What if a new combination were created today?

[Answer] It depends on the combination.

[Question] If a force between the Alignment and the Likud were to emerge, would you go with it?

[Answer] If you are talking about membership in the Knesset, I have no interest in going to the Knesset. I am not a new immigrant in the Knesset, and what is the use of my sitting in the cafeteria another 4 years? All the years that I was in the Knesset and involved in political executive activity, I played key roles. I was not only a member of Knesset or only one who expressed opinions, but I was instead in the hierarchy of the governments in which I participated and in which decisions were taken.

Therefore, when you ask me what I would do if a new combination were created, I will give you the following example.

Let's assume that there would be a list, with those views I was in complete agreement, and it had 5 to 7 representatives in the Knesset. That list would have neither the authority nor the importance in the determination of government policy. Perhaps it would have a minister or one and one-half ministers and they would give him a marginal role -- but the entities who determine the policy would be the other partners in the government.

For this I would not go. The interest which I had in active participation in political life was that I had a role which had authority or the capability to influence. It is not as if someone were saying: You dragged along the government and you brought it to this, and you did not fight for this, and so forth -- as if the governments really did what I wanted... However, I also do not degrade the extent of influence which I had. A list with a few representatives will not have such a degree of influence among the large entities. I am not interested in anything less than this. The question for me is not to gain a seat in the Knesset.

[Question] Just a few days ago, a survey was published which states that a list headed by you and with Weizman and Tamir would win 19 seats. This is already a significant number of seats. Do you believe in surveys and how does this combination appear to you personally?

[Answer] I do not know about surveys. There is a poem by Alterman called "Signs", and the refrain there consists of two parts. The first part says: "Because signs, my daughter, speak falsely." Later in the poem, he says: "Signs, my daughter, speak truthfully." This is my opinion of surveys.

In order for me to join a list, it must have two essential ingredients. First, there must be an identity of views on policy and on the main issue of the Palestinian problem. Second, it must have prospects for becoming an important factor which would influence and determine government policy. I do not want to mention names, but I do not see a possibility of a combination like that which existed with the establishment of the DMC because the combination was on the basis of a unanimous desire to change the situation and to enter the political life of the Knesset. These two ingredients are not sufficient as a basis for a party which would not disintegrate shortly thereafter. When it comes to the implementation of the policy, it becomes evident that the common denominator is the running for the Knesset or also the desire for change but not the other positive things.

I do not see such a list, and a list cannot be one of only three people or only headed by three people. Such a list must be homogeneous in its political viewpoint, and it must have the prospect of obtaining such a number of seats that it would be able to be an influential factor in the government.

[Question] If you were asked to be a member of the government in a position of influence and action -- and let's leave for the moment the question as to which government this would be -- is there a possibility that your response would be affirmative?

[Answer] The importance of the members of the government is determined by two factors; first, by their specific position, to be the minister of social betterment or another minister; second, by the body which asks them with its number of members of Knesset. Without mentioning names, there were members in this government whose

intellectual quality was undoubtedly on a high level, and their actual influence on matters of general policy was very slight because the prime minister did not want to honor them. They were unable to threaten resignation because their departure would not have shattered the coalition. The question is not only membership in the government but also the position, the body in back of you, and first and foremost, the basic policy of that government.

I can say now that I cannot participate in a government which would implement the policy of the Likud. I left it because I was not a partner in it, and therefore, I would not return to it. I do not expect that the policy of the Likud will change in such a way that it would bridge the gap between us. And what about the policy of the Alignment? I do not know. Today I turned on the news at 0100, and the news was skimpy. They only spoke about two subjects, about two wars: between Iran and Iraq and between Rabin and Peres.

[Question] Why aren't you prepared to respond to questions which concern the competition in the Labor Party?

[Answer] I do not want to get involved in matters in which I am not a partner. I am not a member of the Labor Party. If I were a member of the Labor Party, I would be obligated or compelled to support one of the sides. Therefore, I do not want to get involved with this matter or express an opinion.

[Question] Is your "Sede Boqer" in Tsahala a basic or conjectural matter? That is to say in the current constellation, as you explained, you are sitting in Tsahala, but...

[Answer] When Ben Gurion went to Sede Boqer, he said that he wanted to leave for 2 and only 2 years in order to take a rest from these matters -- and then to return.

As I evaluate the development of things in the country, my departure from the executive positions is final. I do not see any possibility, not for myself and not for the Alignment, that I will join or return to the Alignment. I do not see any possibility that I will join the Likud, and I do not see any possibility of another list, in addition to the religious ones, which would have the importance that would give me the possibility of playing a key role and significantly influencing government policy.

[Question] One of the reasons for your departure was that Begin did not give you a key role in the conduct of the negotiations. If Begin were to call you today and say: I have tried this way of negotiations with Burg and with a ministerial committee, and I have failed. You take it. Is this possible?

[Answer] Begin would say such a thing? Apparently you do not know him... but nevertheless, the days of this government are numbered. There is no reason now, even if the situation were like your hypothetical description, to join the government. We are moving towards the elections, 2 months earlier or 2 months later.

If Begin were to propose to me that I come and get involved in the autonomy negotiations, and it would be in accord with my policy, I would suggest to him that I serve as an assistant to the prime minister, not as a member of the government, and

I would get involved in this matter. Of course, all these proposals would have to be approved by the government, and I would be involved in the technical part, without being a member of the government.

However, in my opinion, the entire picture is hypothetical. From my point of view, I consider this subject, the negotiations for a settlement with the Palestinians, to be an important one, so I would devote all my time to it. I believe that this issue requires progress, and if they believe that the way which I propose is correct, I am ready to be an official involved in it. However, this is not a practical question.

[Question] Are you still a member of the Labor Party?

[Answer] No. When I announced that I was accepting Begin's offer to be the minister of foreign affairs, I received a letter from the secretary of the Labor Party which stated that this was unacceptable to the party and that he thought that I should leave the party. He did not write to me that I was being expelled from the party, and he also did not have the authority to expel me from the party without a trial. I responded to this letter that I was announcing my departure from the Labor Party.

I recently received a letter from the Tsahala branch of the Labor Party which stated that they were calling for new members to join the party. The letter was completely in stencil, and only the name Moshe Dayan was handwritten. I thought about the matter for awhile. What was the purpose of this proposal? I responded to the letter: "I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter." And that was it. I tell this as a matter of curiosity. Of course, this was not the way if the Labor Party wanted me to return or if I had wanted to return to the Labor Party.

[Question] Is there such an opening?

[Answer] There have been no attempts, and in my opinion, there is no such opening.

[Question] Because of the political program?

[Answer] Because I burnt the bridge. The party was opposed to my joining the government. I joined, and I left the party. Although, in my opinion, I have continued to be "Labor" and even a MAPAI'nik and maintain good relations with some of the members and find that there is an identity of views, in the organizational sense of belonging to the party, I do not believe there is such an opening.

I do not know the political viewpoint of the Labor Party. As of now, I do not know if they are basically for a partition of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan. Nevertheless, according to their program today, we have no common basis.

[Question] Even on the price of peace?

[Answer] Even on the price of peace. I believe that the partition of the West Bank means the establishment of a Palestinian state. The PLO has announced that if it is given only Shekhem or 100 square meters, it is ready to accept it, not as a substitute for its political program, but rather as a stage toward the implementation of its well-known political program.

Husayn has said that everything the Palestinians want will be given to them in the West Bank. This means that even if we divide the territory with Jordan, Jordan would subsequently turn over the territory under its control to the Palestinians, and the Palestinians would be administered by the PLO. This is what would happen. The smaller the territory which we turn over, the greater will be the prospect that a war against us will be launched from there because it will not constitute a solution of the Palestinian problem.

[Question] You consider yourself a "Labor" person, a MAPAI'nik. How is this expressed in practice?

[Answer] I can say something between humor and piquancy. When they complain that I helped Begin, I say to those members of the Alignment: listen, was there one proposal of mine which was not adopted by your majority in spite of the opposition of some of the Herut members? Did you vote against any of the proposals which I brought to the Knesset? With whose strength were they actually adopted? With the strength of the Alignment. And who were those who voted against? One time there were four abstentions from the Alignment: Shlomo Hillel, Shoshana Almosalino, Yigal Allon, and Amos Hadar. All the others voted for. Most of those who voted against or abstained were from the NRP or the Herut.

I never had a proposal on foreign policy which the Alignment did not support. The proposals which I brought to the Knesset were supported more by the Alignment than by the Likud.

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SCHOLARS ASSESS JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESS

Tel Aviv **AL HAMISHMAR** in Hebrew 19 Sep 80 pp 5,10

[Article: Israel's Policy in the Territories—from Failure to Settlement]

[Text] Israel's policy in the territories omitted the Jordanian option and gave the PLO international stature; the PLO would have needed 50 more years to achieve its present status, had it not been for Israel's mistakes; even now the Jordanian option holds the only realistic chance of insuring Israel's security and solving the Palestinian problem both as a human and a political problem—each day a territorial compromise becomes more imperative. Such compromise must be clearly defined, encompassing most of the territories, including a flexible, agreed solution to the problem of East Jerusalem.

These conclusions were the running theme of the symposium conducted by **AL HAMISHMAR**. Participants were: Professor Yehoshua Porat, head of the History of Islamic Countries study group at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; Professor Menahem Milson, head of the Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University, who accompanied President Sadat in Jerusalem in November, 1977; and Tzvi Alpeleg, a retired colonel who studies the Palestinian subject at the Shiloah Institute at Tel Aviv University.

Hayim Shor (moderator): The purpose of this symposium is to examine Israel's policy in the territories. But first I would like to ask a question. What is your assessment of the chances of a Palestinian state, a Jordanian-Palestinian state, either linked or separate from Hussein?

Yehoshua Porat: I consider the Jordanian solution to be the best one. It is the lesser of the evils for the Arabs and the best for Israel. It can be achieved in terms of the political and historical circumstances under which the Arabs in question now live. It should be done quickly, since there is no other way to extricate ourselves from the maze of the Israeli conquest of the West Bank.

Menahem Milson: I agree with Professor Porat. A political agreement with Jordan is the preferred solution for Israel. It is feasible in territorial terms, since the geographical aspect is clear. Jordan, the east bank, is the link of the West Bank to the Arab world. In regard to population, half of Jordan's residents east of the river are Palestinians who originated in the west side of the Jordan. A Palestinian state exclusively in the West Bank is a risk for both Israel and

Jordan. It would be a problem, since east of the Jordan Amman has become the political center, while a state west of the Jordan would look to establish Jerusalem as its political administrative capital, which would make a settlement in Jerusalem extremely difficult.

A Missed Opportunity of Settlement

Tzvi Alpeleg: I agree in principle. I believe that after 67 we had the opportunity to reach a settlement with the representatives of the local population. We could have created some sort of an autonomy, based on an agreement between Israel and Palestinian representatives in the territories, without any link to Jordan or the PLO, and in time a broader base would have been found, namely, a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli base. But this opportunity was missed in the years following the Six-Day War.

The new situation which has now come about leads us to a political settlement based upon Husayn's federation plan, which was proposed by him in 1972. This plan, with certain changes, was in effect the basis for negotiations. If Israel had reacted differently--in 1972 Israel rejected it categorically--then we could have had negotiations which would have led to a *modus vivendi* which would have satisfied all three parties. Israel might have achieved its security objectives. Husayn might have achieved his sovereignty objectives, and the Palestinians would have achieved a certain measure of political expression for their national aspirations.

Husayn's aspirations to recover the West Bank still exist. It is a vital interest for the Jordanian regime not to bring about a total separation between the two banks which would undermine the regime and cause serious upheaval. The Palestinians cannot expect much more than such a settlement. I think they know it, at least the FATAH knows it, that for now it is in their interest to come to an agreement with Jordan. If Israel continues to reject categorically the Jordanian wish to discuss its sovereign status in the West Bank, Israel will go against its own interests and will precipitate the establishment of a Palestinian state in an extreme form.

National Consolidation in Its Infancy

Yehoshua Porat: National consolidation, the consolidation of a national identity in the Middle East, is still in its infancy. The Arabs have only begun to struggle with their own identity: Are they one national group which should establish one state? If not, what is the legitimate national structure of their future state? The concepts of Jordanian and Palestinian are fluid. All Arabs express loyalty to a unified ideology, which sees the Arabs as the only legitimate group for the existence of the state. On the other hand, there is a territorial division into states, none of which, except for some fringe groups, has developed an ideology which sees the state as the main basis for national identity.

Nevertheless these states exist, and like any other political institution they create pressure groups, interests, and identity. This maze has brought about the present situation. Hence when we talk about Jordanians versus Palestinians, we are not talking about something analogous to Frenchmen and Germans. Take Jordan,

annex it to Syria, and in a few decades Jordanian identity will disappear. The same is true about Palestine. The same is true in other parts of the Arab world, except perhaps for the Maronite community in Lebanon. The Egyptians too were once in this state and today they have a different ideology. In Iraq today there is a surprising adoption of Iraqiness which searches for Babylonian roots.

We sometimes get the impression that the Israeli public conceives Palestinianism the way Germanism was conceived by German nationalists in the 19th century, as self-understood, different from the Slavs in the east or the French in the west. The reality in Jordan has proved how the emphasis there has changed: from Syrian to Arabic; from Arabic to Jordanian; and how the Palestinians became part of it, and how readily they became part of the Jordanian system; and how there was no struggle in Jordan or any propaganda to break away and form a Palestinian entity, rather there was opposition to the Hashemite regime because of its foreign policy, its objection to militant Arab nationalism, and its moderation toward Israel; because of its objection to Nasser. But not in the name of Palestinianism.

The Political Border Is the Determining Factor

In Europe, excluding clear ethnic foci which created nations, what has determined national affiliation has been the political border which was drawn by the various powers in their various capitals. The border between Holland and Germany was not determined by Dutch or German ethnicity, but by the political power of the group which established the Merchants' republic in Amsterdam and set its own border. This border determined Dutchness, rather than Dutchness determining the border.

The Middle East's situation is similar to Medieval Europe. The commonly used written language and culture is completely different from the spoken language, which is yet to be written, which does not represent a particular region, and which is made up of many dialects. This indicates how much free play still exists among the political powers when it comes to decide on established borders or shaping regimes in the Middle East, and to what extent the forces in the area can influence the shaping of the area. Some argue that the Palestinians feel like strangers, that Amman is foreign to them, the way a German would feel like a stranger in Warsaw. They add that the Palestinians have their own dialect, different from the Jordanian. This is unfounded. Not a word of truth in it. Even if there were a linguistic difference between the Jordanians and the Palestinians, Amman is the largest Palestinian city in the world. Amman had 30,000 inhabitants in 1948. Today it has one-half million. Where did they all come from? Not from natural growth. Those were the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who left.

Some people assume that anyone who supports the Jordanian solution wants to deliver the Palestinians to a totally foreign rule. This is not true!

One Nation, One State

Menahem Milson: Let me make a point which supports Professor Porat. I recall a talk with a prominent Palestinian leader who supports Jordan. He said he rejects Husayn's federation plan. I thought he rejected it because it did not give enough expression to the Palestinian component. I asked him to explain the

rejection of the plan, and he said that the plan was not good, because it spoke about a united kingdom, as if we were two separate parts. After all, it is one kingdom and it should become again one state. Why a federated kingdom all of a sudden? What's bad about a single kingdom? We are one people, one public, there is no need to make distinctions. I believe this shows that they consider themselves one people.

Take the example of Libya, which was created after WWII. The creation of a Libyan state and a Libyan people was the decision of the world powers, the colonial powers. If they had decided on dividing Libya into three regions, Tripoli, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica, would have had three political groups, not one. Even today this one group exists as part of the Arab people living in one political state. I therefore agree with Professor Porat's observation, that the chance of creating a political structure which will last and which will encompass Palestinian political aspirations is realistic, with Amman as its capital. It is also a better option for Israel than an Arab state in the West Bank.

Palestinian Identity Is A Fact

Alpeleg: We should now ask ourselves what is the concrete meaning of what has been said so far. The Arabs accept the Pan-Arab ideology. They consider themselves one nation which was divided by strangers, broken down into separate states etc. The question is how does this apply to what we are talking about. Is or isn't a Palestinian considered a stranger in an Arab country he happens to go to?

Shor: Husayn himself says that he doesn't represent the Palestinians. He must have his reasons.

Alpeleg: The borders were drawn by the powers which won WWI, thus creating separate political identity for each of these states. I am sure that this is not forever. It will change. If there is a tendency in Europe to erase the national and political borders, it can also happen in the Middle East. What separates the states here is much less than what separates them in Europe, and what unites them is much more also. If this were true not only ideologically but also concretely, the Palestinian problem would disappear in 30 years. The Palestinians have kept a separate identity not only because of the ill will of the Arab regimes. And there is ill will. They were given citizen rights, but they were kept as strangers.

We are dealing with a concrete subject: the resolution of the problems between us and the Palestinians. Does the ideology or the fact that the Arabs are one nation and the Palestinians do not have a separate national identity have any significance?

In my opinion, since our problems are short-range ones and the changes are long-range, it would only have academic meaning if we dealt with the question, who are the Palestinians? Part of the Arab nation or not? In our present reality they are a separate group, with problems which regrettably we should consider as ours, and which call for a solution.

Freedom of Movement and Employment in Jordan

Milson: I believe that the Jordanian example, that is, the way the Palestinians were absorbed in Jordan, whether or not they were refugees, shows the possibilities. Jordan gave them citizenship, freedom of movement, and employment. They do not feel like strangers. Most of the Jordanian administration is in Palestinian hands. They are active in the security system. The head of the security services for many years was a Palestinian from Nablus. The same is true in the armed forces, where there are many Palestinian commanders of combat units. They have attained high ranks in the army and are in key diplomatic positions. The way they have been absorbed in Jordan shows the potential of a political structure which is willing to accept them and give them an identity.

Alpeleg: This sounds as though Israel's best bet is to wait around until the Palestinian problem is resolved by the assimilation of the Palestinians.

Milson: No! What it means is that if a political entity is established after negotiations with Jordan, which will include east Jordan and the territories which Israel is willing to give back, this entity will be able to accommodate the Palestinians.

The determining factor is the denial of citizenship, freedom of movement, and employment, which happened to Palestinian refugees in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. A villager from the Ramle area, who became a refugee and went to Nablus, is seen as a stranger by the local people. He cannot readily get married there. He cannot easily buy land. This is typical of Arab society, in which a member of another tribe or another village is long considered a stranger. Yet in the mercantile urban society, and in the urban elite, people moved from Jerusalem to Amman and from Nablus to Salt and have not been regarded as strangers. Religious functionaries from Hebron serve in all Jordanian towns and are not seen as strangers. Thus, we should be able to see the difference between stranger status which is the result of political circumstances and decisions, and the one which is not political and does not delay political processes.

Failures and Missed Opportunities

Shor: All three of you spoke about mistakes Israel has made in regard to the residents of the territories. What should be Israel's policy in regard to the territories until the end of the negotiations?

Porat: I think it's a pity that we took over the territories. We could have refrained from doing it on June 5, 1967. The main war was with Egypt. We won quickly. Jordan did not try to conquer Israel. The occupation stopped the Jordanization of the Palestinians. We now must find a way to make King Husayn understand that he can get back the territories. The residents of the territories should be made to understand that this is Israel's intention.

In the summer of 1967 the Central Jordanian Bank and the Israel Bank came to an agreement on a joint control of the banking system in the West Bank in order to renew its activity by professionals. This could have given Jordan a certain legitimacy in the territories. The military government aborted it. There are many more examples. Recently I have heard people who headed the military government say that for the first 3 years they saw Jordan as the enemy and undermined its position.

Today, achieving this goal is much harder. Today we must pay a much higher price, especially in Jerusalem. I think that in 1967-68 we could have insured our security needs in the territories and reached a much better solution in regard to Jerusalem. Now we must strive toward a Jordanian solution and make it clear to the inhabitants. This would strengthen the pro-Jordanian elements in the territories.

Israel's Policy Undermined the Chances of Settlement

Milson: An Israeli political decision for a settlement with Jordan does not go against history but rather seeks to create or to renew a political structure which does not contradict the natural internal forces in the Arab Palestinian society. In other words, it is not an artificial manipulation. On the contrary, it is the result of what I have said before about the successful integration of urban elite of west Jordan within the east Jordan system, under rather difficult circumstances, under both the previous and the present cabinet, including leaders from west Jordan, not to mention the economic establishment, etc.

Shor: You may want to touch on the resistance to Jordanian forces.

Milson: I have learned that the Israeli policy damaged the Jordanian option, yet it did not destroy it. This option is linked to the geographic and demographic reality. The possibilities exist, but the damage was caused by the effort to separate the political establishment in the West Bank from the Jordanian center of power.

In answer to my arguments, the supporters of the policy at the time, the Dayan policy, said two things. First, they agreed, and said that it was unavoidable in light of Jordan's support of the terrorists. Second, they said that Jordan undermined our efforts to create normal conditions because of its claim to this area.

Finally, Major General Rafael Vardi, who was at the time the military commander of the West Bank and later the coordinator of the territories, said at a public forum that Jordan was considered the enemy. This of course raises two questions. First, did those who did those things understand the political implications, namely, if you weaken Jordan's political influence you strengthen rival forces which compete with Jordan in the area, namely, the PLO. Was it a calculated risk, or was the risk taken without understanding the danger? Moreover, this explanation is valid until Black September, until the liquidation of the PLO's military power in Jordan. After Black September, when it was clear to all that Jordan is not a host country for the terrorists and thus we are not at war with it, on the contrary, after Jordan destroyed their military power and limited their activities, why did we continue to encourage the anti-Jordanian elements?

This attitude was expressed by holding elections in 1972. This brought about municipal elections in the West Bank in 1972 in contravention of international conventions. Israel found a loophole for doing it, but it was not so self-understood, and it went against Jordan's wishes. The only rational excuse for this move was the desire to create an urban political establishment independent of Jordan.

We now know the results of that move. During the 1972 elections, the defense minister made an effort to see to it that Hamdi Knean, who was pro-PLO got elected. The fact that he didn't run and was not elected, and instead Haj Mazur al Misri, who was pro-Jordanian, ran and was elected, was not the result of the official policy but happened in spite of it, and was reluctantly accepted.

Supporting Anti-Jordanian Palestinian Elements

Porat: During the first 5 years, and it was clear that Jordan had the main claim from the international standpoint, and also had the greatest support in the territories, our policy in the territories was anti-Jordanian, designed to weaken the main claimant. After Rabat, when our main claimant is the PLO, we are anti-PLO. The basic intention of all our governments has been to keep the status quo in the territories. The status quo in the territories is the goal of governments, the goal of the decision makers in all the governments of Israel. Not an annexation status quo, but one of military rule, which gives us military control while sparing us the difficult problem of what to do with the population politically.

Milson: I disagree with Professor Porat. You describe things rationally, but I don't think the reality in the area is rational. If that were the case, there would at least have been consistent policy. In my opinion, there is something more serious here: a tradition was started of supporting anti-Jordanian Palestinian elements which has continued even after Rabat. It is a strange thing. I prefer therefore to talk about deeds and results, not about reason. There is a great deal of disparity between our actions and our statements in the past, and we do not know the thoughts of those who spoke and those who acted. There was a tendency to regard pragmatic leaders--and generally the pro-Jordanian were pragmatic--as those who did not follow extreme nationalistic examples and symbols, which demand immediate fulfillment.

The Israeli trend during the entire period of our rule in the West Bank has been to treat with greater respect extremist leaders. At times it was necessary, because of circumstances, to treat them harshly. But they were still considered the natural leaders. The pragmatic leader was belittled as not being a natural leader. He was a personage out of the past, a servant of the rulers, who was treated with disrespect. This was a mistake, from the standpoint of Israel's interest, since it is in Israel's interest to be able to deal with pragmatic leaders who are willing to negotiate.

This is also a mistake in misunderstanding political reality. For you cannot say that those extremist leaders who want immediate fulfillment of the messianic vision of Arab nationalism are the natural and authentic leaders. Israel's partiality toward the more extreme may be subconscious and unrelated to political reason. This partiality has continued for a long time. It found its expression in belittling and undercutting leaders like Aziz Shahada and even Jabri. Contrary to popular belief, Israel's attitude toward Jabri has not been one of support. In the 1972 elections Israeli leaders encouraged anti-Jordanian Palestinians to run against Jabri. This was due to the Israeli view which regards radicalism as the authentic expression of the Arab public. The pragmatic leader was not seen as a spokesman of the people.

We Expelled the Right Representatives

Alpeleg: No doubt the results of the war, namely, the severing of the West Bank from the east, the halting of the Jordanization process of the Palestinians, or their integration in the Jordanian kingdom, worked against Israel. But it seems to me that even after the occupation, or particularly after the occupation, we could have taken advantage of the situation and benefit from it. We could have said to Jordan, we give you back the West Bank with conditions which the king might not have agreed to before the occupation. We could have reached a *modus vivendi* with him which would have been in Israel's interest, more so than before 1967. We could have gotten rid of the burden of the West Bank's population and reached a settlement with Jordan.

If the actual occupation of the West Bank was a mistake, the second mistake was made immediately afterwards when we did not look for a way out of the new reality. Not only we did not look for a bilateral settlement between Israel and the residents of the territories, we prevented it. We expelled the leaders, thinking that this was our chance to extricate ourselves from the Jordanian embrace. These will always be supporters of an independent Palestine, as exemplified by Aziz Shahada and others. They said that they never agreed to the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan. They said that this was their chance finally to speak for themselves. What did we do to them? We said, we don't talk to you. They went home and waited to see what would follow. Instead of reaching a settlement with the local residents, we missed in the first stage the broader settlement of the two options. Instead we followed a policy which pushed Jordan out.

Even that part which is considered planned policy--the open bridges and the salaries and the link to Jordan etc.--is only circumstantial, it came about, and the policy makers in the territories accepted it after the fact and allowed their commentators and public relations officials to tell the public that this was Israeli wisdom, which was planned accordingly.

There Was No Political Conception

Shor: In other words, this whole aspect of the policy was not planned?

Alpeleg: I have an explanation for the bridges affair which is anchored in the political reality.

Milson: What caused the acceptance a posteriori by Dayan of this situation was economic necessity and not political conception. The one who tried to come up with a political conception and decided on the bridges was Baruh Yekutieli. There is clear evidence about it in Shabtai Tevet's book. Even the term open bridges was coined by Yekutieli, who was one of the key people at the time in dealing with the economic and fiscal problems of the West Bank on behalf of the military government. But as for the policy makers--like Dayan--this was the result of economic necessity. An effort was made to find markets in Europe. An agreement was sought with the suppliers of the American army in Germany, but it didn't work out. Since nothing worked this solution was reluctantly accepted.

Porat: I would like to add, it is not so much economic as internal politics, namely, the power of the farm industry in Israel. The farm lobby in Israel exerted great pressure because of the competition of the surplus in the West Bank which is produced by cheap labor, hence at a lower price. Afterwards people said, this is proof of openness toward Jordan. It was not openness toward Jordan, but acceptance of a situation which came about.

We Have Helped the PLO to Dominate the Territories!

Alpeleg: We had a liberal intention, but in the end we achieved the opposite results. We sinned through ignorance in dealing with the Arab population.

Shor: But we cannot say that this was the result of the Israeli administration closing the two options, the Jordanian and the Palestinian, which only left the option of keeping the territories.

Alpeleg: I have no doubt that the political positions of the residents of the territories contradicted the Israeli occupation and the Israeli presence. They contradicted the Israeli occupation not only because Israel had certain intentions including or excluding Jordan. As long as Israel was in the territories, their position was contradictory. Let us assume that Israel did not make all the mistakes it has made and continues to make, in the area of settlements, of expropriation of land--would the political position of the residents have been in favor of Israeli presence? The political position of the residents, for young to old, has been--negation of the Israeli occupation. The fact that this political position was translated into political action and became a confrontation which cannot be dealt with, was not foreseen. It was contrary to expectations, not my expectations, but Moshe Dayan's expectations. Those expectations did not come true. In terms of the political solution, we actually have helped to PLO to take charge. If Arafat could be honest with himself, he would hand up pictures of Israeli leaders in his office. Because of their mistakes the PLO gained momentum and became prominent.

Porat: This, by the way, reminds me of the argument that the enemies of Israel made an important contribution to the birth of Israel, because of their rejection of solutions which would have taken the wind out of the sails of the Zionist movement.

Milson: This is a very generalized analogy. It does not fit your concept of Arab nationalism, which points to certain solutions, namely, either a Palestinian state or total rejection of a solution to the problem of Palestinian Arabs.

Alpeleg: I tend to accept this analogy. We have adopted their lack of wisdom. I am convinced that without stopping the integration process, without separating the West Bank from Jordan, and then without that policy or lack of policy in the territories after 1967, the PLO would have needed another 50 years to achieve what it has already gotten. Its growing international stature is the result of the situation which was created in the territories after 1967.

Porat: I don't think Dayan is the only one who should be chastised. Let us remember how the Israeli government reacted to the Jordanian federation plan, not only negatively, but insultingly, despite the fact that it was one of the wisest ideas at the time.

Alpeleg: Golda said Husayn was trying to furnish someone else's apartment.

Porat: In the territories the plan enjoyed wide support. All of this was hidden from the Israeli public. The plan was looked upon with disdain. In this respect the Alignment was no better than the Likud. I agree, the oil does not explain everything, our mistakes do. Not only the mistakes in the territories, but also our political mistake of not offering a clear alternative for the PLO, which makes the PLO the only alternative to occupation. Our policy is seen, correctly, as a desire to perpetuate the status quo. The PLO thus gains support.

Nowhere in the western world did I find more public sympathy for Israel and the Jewish people than in Norway, more so than in Holland. Norway provides its own oil. Its change of attitude toward Israel is incredible. Does oil explain it? Great Britain has also changed its tune toward Israel without being dependent on oil, and having close economic ties with us, since we buy a great deal there.

Oil is not the only deciding factor. What is deciding is the fact that we present a policy which no one can buy. Europe, having issued the Venice document, does not demand that the PLO recognize Israel. After all that happened, they have not given up their basic stand which says that the Jewish people has a right to its own state and to self-determination. If we continue with our insanity, we will destroy the last vestige of friendship left.

The Position of the Arabs in the Territories as a Political Factor

Milson: There have been many discussions which still continue about our policy in the territories. The Israeli public is engaged in a very lively discussion between those who would like to make concessions and those who won't give up land under any circumstances. Those who are willing to give up some land and those who are willing to give up everything. In the meantime it has not been made clear to the public that that our policy in the territories makes it impossible for us to deal with the territories. Most of those who are willing to make concessions do not see them as an end in itself, but as a price we have to pay to achieve the end. What is the end? The end is Israel's existence as a democratic Jewish state. It is also peace. To achieve these ends we have to pay the price. In order for Israel to pay the price, the territories have to be managed in such a way that they do not become a burden. If they are a burden, and if there is unrest, and if the voice of the PLO is the only one heard in them, then we may not even be able to use the territories as a bargaining card. The Arabs read the papers and analyse the situation and they may reach the conclusion that Israel may have to return the territories for nothing. Let us remember that for the Arabs to sign a peace treaty is a not an easy thing to do.

We today, after we have signed a peace treaty with Egypt, are still not aware of the fact that the signing of a public peace treaty is a high price to pay for the Arab political standpoint. In order for the Arabs to pay such a price we have to give them something in return. Hence the situation in the territories affects our ability to conduct negotiations regarding the territories and implement policies. A common Israeli conception among policy makers has been that the political positions of the residents are not important. Israel would reach a solution without outside parties, since the residents and their leaders are not independent. It is true that they are not independent, but this does not mean that their political positions are not important.

Moreover, anyone who studies the PLO knows that the PLO believes that without establishing a monolithic rejection front against the Camp David accords in the territories, the accords cannot be defeated. Therefore the PLO is working on establishing such a front. It does it by giving money to its supporters and by intimidation and ostracizing and physical terror against its opposition. Hence the voice of the residents is important in any political settlement.

The slogan which has prevailed in Israel, according to which we are conducting a dialog of deeds with the residents is very dangerous. Besides the fact that this is a rhetoric ploy, since a "dialog of deeds" is a contradiction in terms, since deeds are not a dialog, this slogan is also a coverup for the lack of a political dialog, which is needed and which should be pursued. Or the slogan "coexistence," is also a coverup for the absence of an agreement, when we talk about "coexistence" instead of agreement. The slogan "coexistence" went up in smoke of burned tires.

Porat: The only thing which made an impression on the Arab public was our ability to rule the territories with a minimum of resistance, as we captured the PLO units and prevented riots.

Milson: It is important to distinguish between those leaders who are moderate and those who are not. If the only voice heard in the West Bank is the PLO's, we cannot conduct meaningful negotiations with Jordan, since Jordan needs certain conditions under which to conduct negotiations. First of course we must have Israeli readiness to make territorial concessions, but this is not enough. The Rabat resolution took Jordan out of the negotiation process, and now it needs conditions which will enable it to come back. For this purpose it cannot have a united front in the West Bank, which supports the PLO, but needs to hear from those who do not support the PLO and believe that Jordan is a good basis for a solution. In other words, we have to reach a state of affairs in which they can speak up.

In a practical sense the difference between a moderate and a radical leader, besides supporting the PLO, is the willingness to have normal relations with Jews rather than use every incident to create friction with the Israeli government or public.

Porat: But why do you accept without criticism the provocative behavior of the settlers? It is not unrelated, and it can be changed.

Milson: I believe that law enforcement and prevention of provocations should apply to both sides. As long as the government is there it has to take care of both Jews and Arabs. I am talking about a moderate Arab leader and a radical one, both of whom are lumped together by a large segment of the Israeli public which says that all Arabs are the same! We are aware of different kinds of Jews and different kinds of Jewish conducts. Most of us are. But there is a mistaken notion which says that all Arabs are the same. Haj Mazuz al Misri did not love Israel, but when he served as mayor of Nablus he did not support the PLO but Jordan. He was in favor of an agreement, while Hamdi Kenean was not. Israel has an interest--and I am not talking now about ability--to let those who support Jordan make their voice heard so that Jordan can come back. Jordan needs this in order to come back as a representative of the Palestinians in the negotiations, although it needs more. Such people enable us to rule in the territories with less difficulties and less force, which is important in and of itself.

In brief, we have created a situation whereby the pragmatic elements, the law abiding, non-violent ones, have been neutralized in the political arena, their tie to Jordan has been damaged by our moves, while those who look for political underground activities have found fertile ground for their activities.

Shor: If I understand you correctly, whether a Jordanian-Palestinian or a Palestinian state comes about, if we do not initiate a dialog with the Arabs the situation will not improve.

Milson: A political dialog with pragmatic elements in the territories is as important for Israel as any political settlement. If the political character of Jordan changes and the monarchy disappears and is replaced by another regime, the population will remain and we will have to keep in touch with pragmatic leaders who are not close to the radicals in the Arab political spectrum.

We Will Be Able to Insure Israel's Security Needs

Porat: Milson has mentioned the term "interim compromise," negotiating territorial compromise with Jordan. This needs to be clarified. I don't believe that after what happened the Jordanian government will be willing to give up territory, except for minor adjustments. Anyone who speaks about a solution through the Jordanian option needs to realize that it means returning almost everything back to Jordan. There is no chance Jordan or anyone else will agree to the status quo which we have created in Jerusalem--all of Jerusalem in Israeli hands in terms of national sovereignty. The system of boroughs is not a solution either. The boroughs system deals with sewage. Anyone who deludes himself that letting the old city take care of its water and sewage will solve the problem, is quite wrong. What we can achieve is insuring the security interests of Israel in the West Bank. If Sadat understood it, Husayn will also.

The Israeli security interest in the West Bank is to prevent it from becoming a base for a massive attack on Israel. This we have to insure. The more we prepare ourselves for such a future, the better. Swallowing the pill will then be easier. The Alignment's territorial compromise slogan needs to be clarified. Otherwise one may think that the Alignment is not sincere. Things can be carried to the absurd. The fact is that the residents of the territories did not take up arms and would not take up arms to chase the IDF out of Nablus. I believe the Arabs are a wise people. Palestinians who live in Egypt do not like Sadat's initiative. Palestinian students protested his initiative. But when they found out that it meant losing their monthly allowance of 10 pounds on which they live, they said, let us wait and :

I also have the opposite examples. The Egyptian people rose against the British in 1919. The Syrians had a general strike for almost 3 months in 1936 which forced the French to chance their policy and negotiate.

We Have to Switch to Qualitative Terms

Alpeleg: There is an example of Palestinian Arabs, who in 1936 held a general strike and continued to riot for a long time. But the question still remains: why during 70 years of British rule in Egypt only in 1919 there was civil disobedience and why did the Palestinian Arabs let the Jews take the main part of

fighting the British. Husayn had his reasons for worrying about a dialog between Israel and the residents of the territories. His cooperation with the PLO was the result of his fear that Israel will get together with those leaders in the territories who never accepted the Jordanian rule. The problem was indeed what would we do in the territories. I think that what we did in the territories should have brought about the creation of a radical Palestinian state. For how can you keep the status quo and argue there is no one to talk to, we won't talk to the PLO, and that's that.

Of course we did not intend to bring about a PLO state or an absurd situation. I say that there was no well thought out plan. Things were done without thought, unprofessionally, intuitively, and then we tried to dress them up with all kinds of theories. We held elections. Did we really want to get rid of Jabri? The fact is the military government expelled Dr Hamzi Natasha in order to pave the way for Jabri as mayor of Hebron. But Jabri was smarter than us and said, you spoiled it, under such conditions I cannot run when there is terrorism. I have no chance. So the deadline for voter registration was extended twice, to persuade Jabri. But this wise man refused.

It seems to me that in order to do something now toward a solution we have to earn again the right to living space which we lost because of our sins. We need space for maneuvering. We have to reduce the influence of the PLO and create for ourselves or for Jordan the necessary conditions for political activity.

There is one problem which we ignore: the time must come when we will start to talk about ourselves and about the Arabs in different terms. During all the years of the conflict we have measured our relations with the Arabs in quantitative terms, and where such terms are concerned we cannot expect to have the upperhand for long, not in what pertains to size of population, strategy, economic resources, or power in the international arena.

We have to switch from quantitative to qualitative terms: the nature of our relations with this part of the world. We talk about peace? We'll have to talk about peace in unquantitative terms. For what is the goal of Zionism? We came here to build a state which will live in peace with its environment, and not by the sword.

Where Did the Tension Grow

Milson: If we take the 1972 elections, we will see that the political public in Nablus did not want to vote. The town and its leaders were forced to have elections. Moreover, one of the seemingly liberal principles was the separation of words and deeds. For deeds, such as laying bombs, we resorted to punishment. Words of public figures were not punished. This is a destructive principle, because in political life words is part of political action. In the case of an occupied population and its leaders who publicly identify with terrorist organizations, this is a political act. The fact that leaders were not punished and there was no restriction put on them in this matter created a tension, aggravated the conflict, and caused the outbursts which later had to be severely punished. This has changed the territories from an asset which could be used in negotiations to a burden.

What did Anton Atallah do when he was appointed senator in Jordan at the end of 1967? He pledged his allegiance to the king. No doubt this was an act of protest against Israeli rule in the West Bank. He was punished for his words. He was not involved in incitement or terrorist activity, but was rather an old, law abiding man. He was not allowed to return to his home in the West Bank in Jerusalem. Hamdi Kenean, on the other hand, who since 1967 identified with the terrorist organizations and kept praising them during his entire term of office as mayor, was supported by the Ministry of Defense. This was a message to the political crowd in the West Bank.

Alpeleg: If in any of the Arab countries the political act was separated from the political word, as we have tried to do in the territories, I wonder how long the Jordanian regime would have lasted. The question is, why are we trying to do things which have not succeeded anywhere else?

Cultivating Moderate Leadership Rather Than Radical

Milson: The distinction between moderate and radical leadership is often presented in a distorted way, as if this were an artificial distinction. This is not so. Arab leaders (who are political like anywhere else, with their own particular Arab political and cultural characteristics), move along an uninterrupted line which runs between two polarities: one polarity is an eschatological national vision--making Arab unity a reality. The other are the pragmatic needs, the pragmatic interests, and there are people who according to their temper and ideological background are closer to one polarity or the other. Most of them act according to necessity and interests. Israel's objective in the territories is to create an atmosphere which will enable the pragmatic elements to act. They don't have to be created or invented. One only has to create conditions which will enable them to exist without fear of being murdered or liquidated, and, of course, create interest in pragmatism.

If you show willingness to negotiate with Jordan you have to create interests which will help a pragmatic leader justify his position. If you say, there is no negotiation, you play into the hands of the radical. The policy in the territories should be one of encouraging the pro-Jordanian elements to express themselves. I believe Jordan needs it. There are several indications from Jordan that it needs it. People who come back from Jordan say that Jordan and King Husayn never gave up the prospect of returning to the territories. Under the present circumstances, after Rabat and after the rise of the PLO's prestige he needs a justification. The justification can come in two ways: from the Arabs of the territories who would invite him as a legitimate representative, whereby the king will be able to tell the Palestinians and the Arab world that he is the one who can get the biggest prize from Israel. Israel therefore must say, we are willing to negotiate with Jordan, and with Jordan only.

Shor: What about a territorial compromise?

Milson: After the peace treaty with Egypt, in which Israel gave back everything, it will be very hard to achieve a territorial compromise in which Jordan won't demand that Israel return to the 1967 borders, including partnership or part in the sovereignty of Jerusalem.

Two other components have to be looked at: political and diplomatic freedom of action in the area of security. The Camp David accords created an uncomfortable precedent. In the agreement with Jordan the time element should be more substantial. We have to keep in mind that we have many scattered settlements, and also the strategic importance, namely, the security risk. The fact that the West Bank borders on Israel's vulnerability justifies various Israeli demands. The 1967 borders will be Jordan's demand, but this does not mean that an Israeli statesman who suggests a territorial compromise with Jordan must define the initial price according to the Jordanian initial demand, especially when the details of the agreement are not known, and the security problem on our eastern border is particularly difficult.

In addition, we must remember that the point of departure are the Camp David accords, which bind every Israeli government. This framework, which has many drawbacks, also has an advantage, in that the autonomy is an interim arrangement which enables the to reach an agreement without predetermined borders.

In the ignoring of policy in the territories on the part of the Israeli public there has actually been a partnership between the left and the right. There seems to be here a partial partnership between those who want to give up territories for nothing and those who won't give up territories for any price.

Porat: Uri Avneri and Moshe Dayan are natural allies in opposing the Jordanian option.

Milson: Also in looking down on the moderate Palestinian leadership.

Porat: We should mention one example: when the military government helped bring out the newspaper AL QUDS, it was brought out as an anti-Jordanian paper. After a few years it changed its tune. But in the early years, when it first came out with Israeli encouragement, it was anti-Jordanian.

Shor: Gentlemen, we have to stop. I thank you on behalf of our readers for your instructive comments.

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WOMEN'S ADVANCEMENT FACES OBSTACLES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by Y'hudit Knoller: "They Do Not Reach the Top; Politics and Homemaking Do Not Go Hand in Hand--According to Study Examining Reasons Stopping Israeli Women from Reaching Leadership"]

[Text] It is no secret that women who attain key positions in politics suffer from unstable family life. It is no accident, says Professor Shevah Weiss, who coauthored an article in Jewish Sociological Quarterly on the status of women in the Israeli political map.

Women are conspicuous by their absence in political life, as they have been for the past 30 years. There are several reasons for this, according to the authors. Israeli politics is conducted by professionals who make their living in that way. Women who turn to politics also work and take care of a home, and find it hard to compete in their triple role with the professionals. Thus, the most successful women in politics are those who are not bound by the home or do not find their fulfilment in family life.

Yet Israeli politics has some additional characteristics: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the constant state of war have created a male culture. Women have accepted this supremacy unquestioningly, even in the kibbutzim, where men do patently feminine jobs. Despite the elections system which encourages women to present their candidacy, they are stopped by the appointment system which is based on dealing with various pressure groups, including ethnic ones. While women are securing certain positions in this system, only a few make it. According to the study, although 40-50 percent of the party members are women, only 7.5 percent attains party leadership. In the Knesset their number is even smaller, 1-1.7 percent.

The religious parties have contributed their share in pushing women aside by relegating them to the kitchen. There is an additional factor: Israeli women who are involved in politics are less willing to compromise than their male colleagues. They do not tend to accept party discipline and are prone to leave the parent organization and establish their own independent faction in keeping with their opinions and beliefs. This detracts from their chance to get a good place in the list of appointments. Perhaps the fact that they do not have much to lose encourages their lack of conformity.

The status of women who have entered the Knesset is not brilliant.

Since the Sixth Knesset not one woman has served in the foreign relations and security committee. Except for the Fourth Knesset not one woman has served on the financial committee. Women can be found in the education and labor committees, but not as chairpersons.

The only post in which they have served in disproportion to their numbers is the vice chairperson of the Knesset, which is basically a technical post. In the past it was considered prestigious though without authority, but since the number of vice chairpersons has been increased the prestige has declined.

It would have been logical for women to excel in municipal activities—because of the proximity to the home and the flexible hours, as well as the affinity of the female stereotype to municipal work—education, health, welfare, environment, and culture. Also political struggles are considered less intense at that level. But reality is different from theory. Women are even less represented there than in the Knesset. Only one woman in Jewish municipal life, according to the study (and to the best of my knowledge only one Arab woman, Y.K.) has thus far served as mayor, namely Hanah Levin in Rishon Leziyyon.

The authors end with a somber prognosis: "If there is no real change in this matter, the equality of the sexes as proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence will remain hypocritical lip-service."

9565

CSO: 4805

AGRICULTURE HURT BY ENERGY CRISIS, INFLATION

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 Oct 80 p 19

[Article by Aharon Priel: "Energy Crisis and Inflation Badly Hurt Agriculture; Director General of Agriculture Ministry: Farmers Received Financing Covering Only 50 Percent of Investment"]

[Text] No one has yet found the way to settle Israel by establishing new industries. Agriculture is still the way to create new settlements which could be much larger were it not for the cost of water and inflation.

This according to Meir Ben Meir, director general of the Ministry of Agriculture. Mr Ben Meir explains that what limits the growth of settlements is the cost of water and the inflation.

The agricultural planning system debates whether to establish large diversified farms which can withstand changes and fluctuations, or many small ones which have greater social and security value.

Large diversified farms are extremely expensive, as is the cost of water, in which the energy component reaches 60 percent. Yet a large farm can resist social upheaval which results from economic crisis, Ben Meir explains.

He points out that economically the thousands of small farms in Israel today are a great burden which might be overcome if they only grew crops for export.

Ben Meir argues that the government (as well as previous governments) is not patient enough to build an agriculture which can be immune to social upheavals or economic crises. After new farmers who lacked knowledge and experience were able to become established as exporters of fresh agricultural product, "came the big shock of the energy crisis and the inflation in the Israeli economy and turned everything upside down," Ben Meir says.

He maintains that under the present inflation exports could be channeled in two directions: a small number of export farmers with sufficient financing, and a large number of export farmers without sufficient financing. The farmers have received financing which covered only 50 percent of their investment, and the rest was self-financed in ways which caused complications. The devaluation of the pound did not keep up with the loan rates, and the agricultural product which was expected to be the answer of the small farm as part of as many farms as possible entered a greater crisis than any other product, Ben Meir explains.

In order to contend with the cost of water it is necessary to find agricultural products for which the use of water is marginal. In other words, income and "knowhow" oriented products.

The director general of the Ministry of Agriculture is not satisfied with the scope of demands made upon the farmer, who is told to constantly increase his exports on the basis of sophisticated agriculture, and the means which the government and the society put at his disposal. "The result is, we always arrive too late," Ben Meir argues.

The director general maintains that we do not do enough in the area of agricultural research and guidance in the field.

Because of bad times the budget for training new farmers is cut, especially in areas which are economically and socially depressed. The cuts perpetuates the depression. "If we cannot train the new farmers systematically all those big investments we have made in the new settlements will go to waste, including many settlements in the Jordan Valley."

The cuts may cause serious crises, more than we can imagine, agricultural experts believe, as they react to the firing of 60 agricultural trainers.

Despite the difficulties in the present and the grim prophecies, which predicted a black future for the farmers, the ministries of finance and agriculture worked during the past 9 months on extricating the agriculture from its plight. The director general explained that the measures taken by the two ministries helped save the farms from a serious crisis.

Meir Ben Meir puts his trust in two key areas of Israeli agriculture—research and training. He is prepared to fight any attempts to effect mindless cuts in these areas or to dismiss trainers.

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CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

DECLINE IN HOUSING--During the first three quarters of 1980 construction started on only 12,700 new apartments, a 31 percent decline compared to last year at this time. It is now clear that 1980 shows an unprecedented low in new apartment construction. The previous low year, 1977, shows construction of 21,000 new apartments, while 1980 is going to be lower. The main reason for the decline is the reduction in private construction. Construction statistics in 21 large towns in which 55-60 percent of private construction is concentrated, show that through September construction started on 6,960 apartments, compared to 9,900 last year at the same time. These figures are based on official data of the Central Bureau of Statistics, combined with estimates of the Contractors Center, released this week by the center's economist, Mr Binyamin Kendler. It was further reported that a sharp decline in industrial, commercial, and public construction took place this year compared to last. Through September 640,000 square meter of non-residential construction was started, a 28 percent decline compared to last year. Here too construction is the lowest in years. This sharp decline in construction is also the result of delays in signing contracts between the ministry of housing and the construction companies. It will cause a growing shortage in apartments and a rise in apartment cost in the months ahead. [Text] [Tel Avia HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Oct 80 p 14] 9565

BRAIN DRAIN--The problem of "brain drain" in Israel and the need to stimulate research and development activities to prevent this phenomenon was discussed yesterday at the first session of the ministers' committee on science and technology, chaired by Energy and Infrastructure Minister Yitzhak Mod'ai. Professor Gad Hetzrony, director of the Council for Research and Development, reviewed the interdepartmental system related to research and development subjects and pointed out that the tasks are scattered in government departments and there is a need to organize the research and development system in the overall national planning. The question of activating the National Council for Research and Development which will convene in a few weeks was also discussed. Mr Mod'ai stated he had contacted Knesset Chairman Yitzhak Berman with a request to establish a Knesset committee for research and development. [Text] [Tel Avia HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Oct 80 p 3] 9565

DEVELOPMENT TOWN EXPORTS--During the first half of the year the export originated in development towns reached 400 million dollars. By the end of the year it will reach 800 million dollars, a more than 50 percent growth compared to last year. These figures were reported by Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism Gidion Pat, to the economic committee of the Knesset. The minister added that 44 percent of all those employed in development areas work in production, as compared to a national average of 25 percent. The minister told the committee that during the first 9 months of the year 155 enterprises were started or enlarged in development areas, costing 800 million shekel, employing more than 3000 workers. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Oct 80 p 7] 9565

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

SOVIET CULTURAL DELEGATION--Amman, 8 Dec (PETRA)--A Soviet delegation representing the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, led by (Shikola), deputy minister of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education in the Soviet Union, arrived here from Beirut last night. The delegation includes (Malatshanov), deputy chairman of the Near East and Middle East department in the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The 9-day visit comes in implementation of the cultural agreement concluded by the Jordanian-Soviet friendship societies in Jordan and the Soviet Union. This agreement is ratified every 2 years. [Excerpt] [JN080954 Amman PETRA-JNA in Arabic 0930 GMT 8 Dec 80]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NEW PORT STORAGE MEASURES--The General Port Authority announced yesterday that it will store transit goods in the open as of tomorrow, Wednesday, without taking any responsibility for any resulting damages. The authority said that it has resorted to this measure due to the pileup of goods in the port warehouses and due to the unavailability of sufficient roofed storage space. The authority urged the maritime companies and agents, shipowners, merchants and importers to pick up these goods immediately and without any delay. The authority will also store goods (belonging to Kuwait) packed in sacks--regardless of whether their contents are for human or animal consumption--in the open as of tomorrow without taking any responsibility for any resulting damage. The Ports Authority has also announced that as of the beginning of January 1981, goods that are not packed well enough to withstand all the handling of all phases until delivery will not be accepted so that the authority may secure the safety of imported goods and may render its services available to all importers. The authority has also asked all importers to stress in the credit letters that they open the need for quality and uniform packaging, and for the use of sacks and of other means of protection that guarantee the delivery of these goods in good condition. The General Port Authority has pointed out that there are certain kinds of goods that arrive packaged poorly. These goods are: All the commercial goods arriving from Taiwan, cast iron sewer and manhole covers from India, commercial goods from Korea, gravel and powder arriving from Italy, canned food cartons arriving from Egypt, redwood arriving from Malaysia and white wood arriving from Romania, Sweden, Finland and Yugoslavia. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 14 Oct 80 p 17] 8494

ASIAN OIL SUPPLY--Oil sources in Jakarta said yesterday that Indonesia will ask OPEC to increase its oil supply to five countries in Southeast Asia. In its capacity as an OPEC member, Indonesia has said that this request is in agreement with the international organization's policy of aiding the developing countries that face difficulty in acquiring their energy needs. Maj Gen Piet Haryono, the director of Pertamina, has noted Kuwait's and Saudi Arabia's ability to raise their oil production to supply these countries, namely: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia imports oil derivatives because of its limited refining capacity. It is expected that Indonesia will submit this proposal to the OPEC ministers meeting scheduled to be held in Bali Island next December. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Oct 80 p 15] 8494

LOAN TO BOTSWANA--A loan agreement was concluded yesterday between the Republic of Botswana and the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development. In accordance

with the agreement, the fund is to advance a 2 million dollar loan to participate in financing the new international (Gaboron) airport in the Republic of Botswana. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Republic of Botswana by Balidzi Jaolit, the permanent undersecretary of finance and development planning, and on behalf of the fund by 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Atiqi, the minister of finance and the appointed chairman of the fund's Board of Directors. The project seeks to build an international airport that links Botswana with the outside world directly. It is expected that the project will have positive effects on the national economy, represented in increased direct trade with the outside world, in addition to bolstering the country's political independence and invigorating the tourist movement. The total costs of the project, whose implementation will start at the end of this year, are estimated at 13.9 million Kuwaiti dinars. The fund will cover 14.4 percent of these costs. It is expected that the project will be completed by the middle of 1984. The loan duration is 20 years, including a 4 year period of grace and it will be repaid in 32 semi-annual installments, the first of which will be due on 15 December 1984 and the last on 15 June 2000. The interest on the loan is 2.5 percent annually, in addition to 0.5 percent annually to meet the costs of managing and implementing the loan agreement. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Oct 80 p 15] 8494

CSO: 4802

MAURITANIA

CHIEF OF STATE INTERVIEWED FOLLOWING CEAO MEETING

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 29 Oct 80 p 5

[Interview with Mohamed Khouna Ould CMSN President, chief of state and government date and place not given]

[Text] During the Sixth CEAO Conference session CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] President, Chief of State and Government gave an important interview to the Nigerian Press in which he outlined the political and economic situation of our country after its withdrawal from the Sahara conflict, his role in the subregional organs in West Africa, the Arab-African cooperation and many other important questions.

Here is the complete text of that interview:

[Question] Mr President, what is Mauritania's political and economic situation after its withdrawal from the Sahara conflict?

[Answer] As you know, we are now watching a world crisis, concerning economic and political situations. The relapses of this crisis are felt in our country.

As you also know, Mauritania belongs to that Sahelian group, which was particularly hard hit by 12 years of prolonged drought.

Otherwise, Mauritania has not escaped the misdeeds of bad administration, which the majority of African nations have known after independence.

Add to that the heritage of 3 years of East Sahara wars.

But, I think that, despite of this particularly difficult context, we are not the most unfortunate ones in Africa. Our situation rather, urges optimism in the future, judging by the conclusions of international organs specialized in the field of economy and finances.

[Question] Mr President, your country belongs to a certain number of subregional organs in West Africa. What is the motivation for that and what do you expect?

[Answer] Mauritania's affiliation to numerous subregional organs comes from its will to fully play its role in the political and economic fight which drives our continent. You know that, as Nigeria, our country occupies a double-barrelled position, between the Arab Maghreb and Black Africa.

This position gives us particular responsibilities towards our people, but also towards the Arab and African people. It is to say that we cannot but be present where these people's interests demand it.

Now, for us, these organs perfectly answer our concern on favoring cooperation between member-countries and in contributing to the acceleration of the continent's economic integration.

[Question] Mr President, what do you make of the Arab-African cooperation?

[Answer] Mauritania fights for an Arab-African cooperation based on the loyalty to the fraternal solidarity principles and support to just causes. But this cooperation, unfortunately, collides with the interest of certain powers which know Africa well, as mutual difficulties between African and Arab countries. Meanwhile, in our bilateral domain we notice encouraging examples of cooperation among certain Arab and African countries.

[Question] Mr President, what do you think about the North-South dialogue and what should be done, according to you, for a profitable organization of a very just new world economic order?

[Answer] We think that, despite the failure of meetings, the North-South dialogue should continue. But the obstinate selfishness of rich nations should urge us, our underdeveloped countries, to organize more, to have better administrations and better control of our resources.

[Question] What opinion do you have of the East Sahara situation and what do you predict would end the conflict?

[Answer] You know that we have withdrawn from the Sahara war and that since then we have maintained a neutral position in this conflict.

But we have noticed that the Maghreb peace doesn't seem to progress at the pace we would have desired. Above all, we notice that after the last meeting of the OAU "ad-hoc" committee in Freetown, our Moroccan brothers opted for a blockade policy to all negotiable solutions.

We have great hope that his situation will end, because an armed solution does not profit anyone.

Only narrow minds are attracted by it. But His Majesty, King Hassen II is one of this century's great men and I am sure that he will find a negotiable solution.

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CSO: 4400

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

QATARI DONATION TO MINISTER--Yedali Ould Cheikh, Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs talked, yesterday, with the Charge d'Affaires of Qatari, on behalf of our country. On this occasion the Qatari diplomat gave the Minister a check in the amount of \$328,000 dollars, his country's aid to outfit the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 30 Oct 80 p 1] 9262

COPPER MINING COMPANY APPROVED--The council of Ministers met, yesterday morning, 24 October 1980. It was presided by Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, president of the Military Committee of National Health, Chief of State and Chief of Government. The council approved an ordnance project to create a joint-venture company called Societe Miniere d'Inchiri [Inchiri Mining Co]. The creation of this company has, as objective, the restarting of the exploitation of the Akjoujt Copper Mine. This operation will have essentially, as consequence, the increase of economic and social activities in this region, sorely tried these past years by the closing down of Ex-Somina and the damaging effects of the drought. [Excerpt] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 25-26 Oct 80 pp 1, 8] 9626

CSO: 4400

KING SOLOMON'S GOLD MINE TO BE REMORKED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 24 Nov 80 p 3

[Text]

LONDON, Sun. — The Arab world should soon know whether it is to get its first new gold mine in nearly 30 years. And all the signs look encouraging for a \$70 million a year gold rush.

While the mine, in Saudi Arabia, will be one of the most modern, it will also be on the site of one of the most ancient gold-workings known to mankind.

For the new mine, for which feasibility studies are expected to be completed before the year-end, will be based on the antique Mand Adh Dhahab — cradle of gold — workings north-east of the Saudi seaport city of Jeddah.

Mining is known to have taken place on this site 3,000 years ago, and some experts believe it could have been the Biblical "King Solomon's mine", the bullion treasure house of ancient Arabia.

JOINT

The mining project is a joint development by the big London based metals group, Consolidated Gold Fields and Petromin, the Saudi state agency concern.

If the Mand Adh Dhahab mine is brought into production, it is anticipated the operation will treat "about 120,000 tonnes of ore per year," a Consolidated Gold Fields spokesman says here.

Gold production could amount to two to three tonnes a year, with associated silver, copper and zinc production, he adds.

At a current gold price of near \$650 an ounce, the mine's gold output could be worth up to \$70 million annually, not including the income from other metals, experts say.

PLANS

Current feasibility plans call for underground development at the mine — situated on an ancient caravan route between the Yemen in the south and Jordan in the north — next year, with full production being achieved in 1983.

The development cost for the project is being put by some experts at some \$30 million making it profitable within months of full production.

This will be the fourth time that Mand Adh Dhahab has been exploited. Mining probably originally took place 3,000 years ago, and was resumed 1,000 years later when as much as 40 tonnes of gold and silver bullion may have been produced, according to Consolidated Gold Fields.

Mining was carried out for a third time between 1939 and 1954 by the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, which produced 23 tonnes of gold and 31 tonnes of silver.

The bulk of this was obtained by treatment of ancient mining "tailings" or waste, the balance being from fresh mining on the surface and underground. The new project could also treat ancient tailings, as well as exploiting new mining.

COSTS

The Saudi Syndicate's development ceased as a result of increasing production costs and depletion of ore reserves.

It is clear that the upward spiral in the world gold price — which this year touched a record \$850 an ounce — is the key in the moves to re-open the "cradle of gold."

Consolidated Gold Fields says that the rising gold price during the 1970s aroused the interest of the Saudi Directorate General of Mineral Resources, which commissioned the US Geological Survey to carry out exploration of the mine.

U.S.-EGYPTIAN JOINT MANEUVERS DISCUSSED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Dahhak: "The Egyptian Regime Is Paving the Way for U.S. Aggression"]

[Text] The joint American-Egyptian maneuvers are part of the preparation for imperialist aggression against the Arab world. Since the beginning of this year the American secretary of defense, Harold Brown, has been making announcements about the readiness of the Rapid Deployment units which have been formed from among the United States' seven armies. Training of these units already began last February in the states of California and Florida. These units include 80,000 regular troops, 40,000 reserve troops, 170 Phantom F-16 fighter planes, 23 B-52 bombers, in addition to 4 squadrons of huge transport planes. Gen Kelley, the commander of the Rapid Deployment units, has announced that this new unit's mission will be that of guarding America's interests in the Middle East. It is no accident that these Rapid Deployment units have been established. They are part of the new American strategy which was planned by Henry Kissinger when he was the American government's national security advisor and when he became secretary of state he made the Rapid Deployment units part of America's actual military strategy.

Political commentators are of the opinion that the basic motive for forming this unit is the United States' fear that another war, such as the October War, will occur between the Arabs and the Zionists and that this will affect the world's oil supply. This fear was expressed by Kissinger after the October War when he threatened to occupy the Arab oil fields unless they were left untouched by the war and outside the scope of the Arab-Zionist conflict.

In March of 1974, the Pentagon gave assurances of its readiness to occupy the oil fields and establish control over these sources of oil in order to keep the oil pumping so that it could continue to be supplied to the United States.

At the time, these statements provoked strong reactions on the part of the Arab nations and the international community. In the face of these reactions, the United States said that it had given up any idea of occupying the oil fields, but in fact the United States continued to lay down a complete American strategy concerning this matter. Nixon, Ford, and Carter, more than once, have stated that the United States will use military force to guard what it has called its vital interests in the Persian Gulf area.

But then there was a succession of events in the Middle East after the signing of the two Camp David treaties. There was the fall of the shah of Iran, who had been playing the role of policemen for the Pentagon in the area, there were the plots to partition Lebanon, there was the failure on the part of the imperialists to expand the civil war in Lebanon, and there was the general expansion of liberation movements in the Arab countries and throughout the world. All of this made the United States give up its policy of being silent on the matter, and it proceeded to reveal its new strategy concerning the Middle East.

In the second conference in Venice, which was held during the latter part of last April, Carter and his secretary of state, Muskie, made announcements concerning America's new plans and concerning Europe's role in carrying out these plans in order to confront what they called the advance of communism and in order to guard their joint imperialist interests.

Part of this plan is that the European nations would provide sufficient military facilities, in terms of logistics and supplies, to the American Rapid Deployment units, and they would participate to the extent that they could in such military efforts. Most of the European nations declared their full readiness to offer facilities, but did not want to become involved in military actions. An exception was Britain, which also announced that it had formed rapid deployment units consisting of airborne troops and squadrons of planes. In connection with this, Britain said that it was going to demand to regain the position that it once had in its base on Cyprus and to the east of Aden. This would be within the framework of cooperation between Britain and the United States.

In October of last year, President Sadat of Egypt signed a treaty with the United States which arranged for providing the U.S. with military facilities, in accordance with the two Camp David agreements. In May of this year the first fruits of this agreement began to appear--in the form of joint maneuvers conducted by the American army and the army of Sadat's regime. These maneuvers went on for 3 months.

A few days ago a second series of maneuvers began. They saw the participation of 1,400 American troops from America's Rapid Deployment forces, in addition to squadrons of transport planes. The maneuvers were being held in order to teach American troops to conduct war in desert terrain, according to a statement made by the Egyptian regime's chief of staff. A few days ago, an S-141 military transport plane crashed near the American air base west of Cairo. All of those on board, including 6 pilots and navigators and 7 passengers, were killed. This was one of the planes participating in the joint American-Egyptian maneuvers which have been called "Rising Star." The objective of the maneuvers is to train a rapid deployment force to deal with emergency situations, in particular those which might occur in the Middle East. They are also being held in order to acclimate American troops to desert terrain and to climatic conditions which predominate in the Arab world. After this crash occurred, Muhsin Hamdi, one of Sadat's major generals, said in a press conference that these maneuvers were being held in order to train Americans in case they would be called upon to intervene in the Arab world.

The training includes land and air maneuvers, with live ammunition, and involves airborne operations. The maneuvers also involve training to defend against tank attacks. These maneuvers are expected to begin before the end of this week.

These American efforts to step up military preparations, which are taking place in Egypt, an Arab country--in addition to American bases which already exist in Somalia, Kenya, Muscat, and Masirah, in addition to expanding the base at Diego Garcia--emphasize the hostile intentions on the part of the United States toward the Arab world. These hostile intentions are being aided and abetted by Sadat, who began this policy by committing his act of treachery and is now paving the way for American aggression not only against the Arab world, but also against liberation movements throughout the world, especially the liberation movements in Africa.

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CSO: 4802

SYRIA

BRIEFS

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ACTIVITIES--The Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian city of Hamat killed four members of the Tishrin corrective movement after abducting them. Military planes [subsequently] bombed some of the quarters in which the Muslim Brotherhood members sought refuge. Those who were killed, were identified as Shaykh (Muhammad 'Ulwan) and Shaykh (Ibrahim Muhammad Arfan). In Aleppo, Muslim Brotherhood members robbed the Central Bank and planted a bomb in a building belonging to the communications administration. In Aleppo too, the Muslim Brotherhood abducted the owner of the Nile Hotel in the (Bab al-Faraj) quarter. The owner (Faruq al-Kusa) was later found murdered in the town of 'Afrin. Reports say that the Syrian authorities have apprehended about 100 Egyptians on charges of dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood. [Text] [NC101600 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1515 GMT 10 Dec 80]

JAPANESE DIET MISSION--Damascus Dec 10--A suprapartisan Japanese Dietmen mission arrived in Damascus Wednesday evening for talks with leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The group, made up of members of the Dietmen's League for Japan-Palestine Friendship, is headed by former foreign minister Toshio Kimura. It was invited by Khalid Fahum, president of the PLO parliament. The mission members plan to meet with Fahum during their stay here until Friday. They will later go to Lebanon for a meeting with Yasir 'Arafat, leader of the PLO. In their meeting with the PLO leaders, the mission members plan to reveal their stand that the organization is the sole representative of the Palestinians, according to sources close to the mission. The Japanese Government has been showing a posture up to now that the PLO is the representative of the Palestinians. But the view to be indicated to the PLO leaders by the mission is a more positive one than that of the government, the sources said. [Text] [OW110104 Tokyo KYODO in English 0028 GMT 11 Dec 80]

OFFICERS DEFECT--Kuwait, Dec 11 (AFP)--Five Syrian officers have flown a helicopter into Jordan and requested political asylum, the Kuwaiti daily AL-QABAS reported today citing Jordanian sources. The newspaper did not specify which branch of the forces the officers belonged to but said that they ranged in rank from "commander to lieutenant." The five reportedly defected from Khalkhalah Airport on the border between the two countries. [Text] [NC111104 Paris AFP in English 1048 GMT 11 Dec 80]

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Jan 5, 1981